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Abstract
Publishing transaction data is important to applications such as marketing research
and biomedical studies. Privacy is a concern when publishing such data since they
often contain person-specific sensitive information. To address this problem, different
data anonymization methods have been proposed. These methods have focused on
protecting the associated individuals from different types of privacy leaks as well as
preserving utility of the original data. But all these methods are sequential and are
designed to process data on a single machine, hence not scalable to large datasets.
Recently, MapReduce has emerged as a highly scalable platform for data-intensive ap-
plications. In this work, we consider how MapReduce may be used to provide scalab-
ility in large transaction data anonymization. More specifically, we consider how set-
based generalization methods such as RBAT (Rule-Based Anonymization of Transac-
tion data) may be parallelized using MapReduce. Set-based generalization methods
have some desirable features for transaction anonymization, but their highly iterat-
ive nature makes parallelization challenging. RBAT is a good representative of such
methods. We propose a method for transaction data partitioning and representation.
We also present two MapReduce-based parallelizations of RBAT. Our methods en-
sure scalability when the number of transaction records and domain of items are large.
Our preliminary results show that a direct parallelization of RBAT by partitioning data
alone can result in significant overhead, which can offset the gains from parallel pro-
cessing. We propose MR-RBAT that generalizes our direct parallel method and allows
to control parallelization overhead. Our experimental results show that MR-RBAT can
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scale linearly to large datasets and to the available resources while retaining good data
utility.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The digital data containing person-specific information are increasingly being collec-
ted, analysed and disseminated, often in response to government laws or to benefit
organizations. For example, private California-based hospitals [13] are required to
publicly release some demographic data for every patient discharged from their facil-
ity1. Electronic Patient Record [88], an online system in the United Kingdom, allows
patients’ demographics, their medical and billing details to be collected and shared.
Tesco, a large retail organization, collect and share their customers’ information with
a range of retailers and manufacturers [103]. Different countries including the United
States of America, the United Kingdom and Canada have also created a range of online
data repositories following open government initiatives [90, 120, 91].
These collected datasets are valuable sources for analytical studies. For example,
health-related personal information shared among healthcare institutions can help ad-
vance personalized medicine [42]. Business Intelligence is another application of
person-specific data. As reported by Chen et al. [15], survey results showed that 97
percent of companies with revenues exceeding $100 million are engaged in business
analytics using the data containing personal information. However, such data often
contain sensitive information about individuals, and releasing them in their original
1http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/hid/Products/Hospitals/QuatrlyFinanData/CmpleteData/default.asp
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form may compromise individuals’ privacy. According to a survey [119], 89% of on-
line users have expressed serious concerns about their privacy. Estimated by Forrestor
Research, e-tailers lose $15 billion a year due to privacy concerns of online consumers
[19]. Westin [61] conducted over 30 surveys from 1978 to 2004 to show people’s at-
titude towards privacy over time and found that the majority fall into the Pragmatic
category i.e. they are willing to share their information only with trusted parties. It
is important therefore that we consider how individuals’ privacy contained within data
may be protected.
1.1 Privacy and Its Protection
Despite the fact that many attempts have been made over a long time [28, 107], we do
not have a single, universally agreed-upon definition for privacy. For example, Westin
[128] defined privacy as an ability to know when, how, and to what extent information
about us is communicated to others. Parent [95] defined it as the amount of control
someone has over information about himself. Allen [4] defined it as an ability to con-
trol the way others have access to us. Not surprisingly, how privacy may be protected
will depend on the specific aspects of privacy that one seeks to protect. For example,
cryptography [118, 134] and access control [10, 47] seek to provide secrecy and pro-
tect access to information, whereas data anonymization [34] controls the amount of
information that can be publicly released.
In this thesis, we consider a scenario where data are required to be released to third
parties or to be made available publicly. Typically, how the published data may be
analysed is not known at the time the data are published. For example, in October
2006, Netflix released a dataset containing 100 million anonymous movie ratings and
challenged the research community to develop predictive algorithms that would do
better than their own recommendation system [6]. At the time of publishing the data,
Netflix could not be certain how the data might be used or analysed. To protect privacy
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in this type of scenario, we need to have the data sanitized (anonymized) to a pre-
defined privacy level, so that no sensitive information about the individuals contained
in the data will be disclosed when the data are released.
1.2 Privacy Protection in Transaction Data
Data can be of different forms, for example, relational data such as demographics,
graph data produced by social networks, search logs maintained by search engines, and
location data collected by location-based applications. Among them, transactional data
are of interest and important. They are a major source of information for understanding
and analysing the habits and activities of an individual.
A transaction dataset is a collection of records called transactions. Each transaction is
a set of items drawn from a domain and is assumed to be associated with an individual.
Table 1.1 shows an example of transaction dataset containing query terms posed by
search engine users, where each search term is an item and each row (collection of
search terms) is a transaction.
User Search logs
Jerry Flu symptoms, Dutch floral designs, Depression and medical leave
Alice Fiber mark , Car crash photos, How to kill your wife
Viccie Parking near Georgia town, Numbness in hand, Breast cancer
Jackie Parking near Georgia town, Dogs food, Breast cancer
Table 1.1: An example transaction dataset
Transaction data are useful in different applications. For example, search logs such as
the dataset given in Table 1.1 can help personalized web search. The diagnosis records
and market basket data can assist in personalized medicine and purchasing trend pro-
jection. However, transaction data also contain person-specific sensitive information,
as can be seen from Table 1.1, which can be disclosed when the data are released.
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To protect such data, transactions are typically de-identified prior to their release. That
is, direct person identifying items such as social security numbers, names or phone
numbers are removed. Table 1.2 shows the de-identified transactions given in Table
1.1. Unfortunately this may not provide sufficient protection for individuals’ privacy
because combinations of non person-identifying items may still be used to identify
an individual in a de-identified dataset [5, 84]. For example, AOL released the de-
identified search logs of its 650, 000 users in 2006 in order to support research [5].
Searcher No. 4417749 was tracked back to Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old resident of
Lilburn from the released dataset by her neighbour, even if the explicit identifiers such
as user names and IP addresses were removed from the released search records. Netflix,
the world’s largest online movie rental service, released a de-identified dataset contain-
ing movie ratings records of nearly a half-million of its users in 2006, with the motive
to improve the accuracy of its movie recommendations algorithm. Narayan et al. [85]
used the rating information from Internet Movies Database (IMDb), another movies-
related website to show that only a small fraction of external information (rating dates
and some movies) is needed to identify Netflix subscribers even if the published data
are fully de-identified. This can then lead to the disclosure of the sensitive information
associated with them, by observing and inferring from movie titles suggesting polit-
ical beliefs (e.g. Fahrenheit 9/11), religious views (e.g. Jesus of Nazareth), and sexual
orientations (e.g. Queer as Folk).
Search Logs
Flu symptoms, Dutch floral designs, Depression and medical leave
Fiber mark , Car crash photos, How to kill your wife
Parking near Georgia town, Numbness in hand, Breast cancer
Parking near Georgia town, Dogs food Breast cancer
Table 1.2: De-identified transaction dataset
Publishing transaction data therefore requires protection against two types of potential
privacy leak: identity disclosure and sensitive information disclosure. identity disclos-
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ure occurs when an individual can be linked to their transactions in the dataset. This
usually happens when certain combination of items occurs uniquely or infrequently
within the released data and an attacker has the knowledge of this combination. For
example, if we know that Viccie is a Lilburn resident and has a numbness problem, then
releasing Table 1.2 will lead to the unique identification of her record in the dataset.
Sensitive item disclosure is where sensitive information about an individual is learnt
with or without identifying their transactions. For example, knowing that Jackie has
searched for Parking near Georgia Town, one can infer that she has searched for Breast
Cancer too.
One solution to preventing such disclosures is to anonymize data [21, 36]. That is, we
perform some form of data transformation so that the frequency of item occurrences
is altered, hence the two types of disclosure are prevented in the transformed data.
Different anonymization techniques have been proposed in the literature [113, 116, 50,
12, 36, 132, 73]. A popular approach is set-based generalization which attempts to
hide an original item by replacing it with a set of items. For example, Table 1.3 is
a set-based generalized version of Table 1.2, where (Fiber mark, Numbness in hand,
Dogs food) is a generalized item which is interpreted as representing any non-empty
subset of the items contained in it. As can be seen, with this type of generalization,
Viccie can no longer be uniquely identified from Table 1.3, even if we know that she
has a numbness problem.
However, protecting transactions through set-based generalization has a price to pay:
we lose some utility in the generalized data. For example, suppose that we need to
count the number of times the search terms Fiber Mark and Dog Foods appear together
in the search log. Using Table 1.3, three transaction records satisfy this query whereas
in the original dataset (Table 1.1), it is not supported by any transaction record. It is
important therefore to have an anonymization method that will not lead to excessive
data distortion. However, finding an optimal generalization solution that achieves the
required privacy protection and retains the utility of the data as much as possible is
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Search Logs
Flu symptoms, Dutch floral designs, Depression and medical leave
(Fiber mark, Numbness in hand, Dogs food) , Car crash photos, How
to kill your wife
Parking near Georgia town, (Fiber mark, Numbness in hand, Dogs
food), Breast cancer
Parking near Georgia town, (Fiber mark, Numbness in hand, Dogs food)
Breast cancer
Table 1.3: An example of set-based generalization
challenging.
Existing transaction data anonymization approaches [113, 116, 50, 12, 132, 73] are
designed to perform anonymization in sequential settings, and typically assume the
use of a single centralized machine. This limits their applicability to small-scale data-
sets. However, data are becoming larger and more scalable anonymization methods are
needed.
One way to enhance the scalability of existing methods is to optimize their memory
utilization. For example, using sampling [63, 65, 75] can help reduce memory require-
ment. However, such strategies may still not be able to deal with increasingly large
datasets [80]. Sample sizes can still be very large and the anonymization solutions
derived from the samples can significantly compromise privacy and data utility. For
instance, Walmart handles more than a million customers every hour, collecting an
estimated 2.5 petabytes of data in the process [1]. Gartner predicts that the amount
of data in all forms will grow 650% in the next five years [3]. According to IDC2,
the amount of digital information doubles every eighteen months. In 2011, the data
held by hospitals and medical centres were estimated to be about one billion terabyte
[3]. When dealing with such large-scale data, parallel and distributed computing using
2http://www.idc.com
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shared-nothing commodity clusters is becoming a promising direction.
Recently, MapReduce [22] has emerged as a scalable and cost-effective data-processing
platform, providing a simple, yet powerful parallel computing paradigm. In recent
years there has been an increasing support for MapReduce from both industry and aca-
demia, making it one of the most rapidly adopted frameworks for parallel processing
of large data volumes today [58]. Google uses its implementation of MapReduce to
process more than ten petabytes of information per day [22, 58]. Hadoop, an open
source implementation of MapReduce, has been adopted by more than 160 different
organizations including commercial companies and research institutes such as Yahoo,
Twitter, Facebook, Amazon and IBM3.
1.3 Research Problem
Our work aims to study how MapReduce may be used for large transaction data an-
onymization. More specifically, we attempt to address the scalability issues associated
with set-based generalization methods [75, 69, 73]. We will focus on the parallel-
ization of RBAT (Rule-Based Anonymization of Transaction data) [72], an existing
transaction data anonymization method, on MapReduce.
RBAT is able to deal with both types of disclosure and can retain high data utility
by allowing fine-grained privacy requirements to be specified. Moreover, it does not
require a generalization hierarchy, hence its search space for generalization solutions
is wider than those explored by hierarchy-based methods. This allows better utility to
be retained in anonymized data.
Since, achieving required privacy level and good data utility are important aspects of a
data anonymization method, our study is based on the following hypothesis:
A MapReduce-based parallelization of RBAT will scale linearly to large transaction
3http://wiki.apache.org/hadoop/PoweredBy
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data while achieving the same privacy level and utility of anonymized data as its se-
quential counterpart.
Note that while we consider the parallelization of RBAT using the MapReduce paradigm
in this thesis, some design aspects of our proposed method are applicable to other trans-
action data anonymization methods too. Thus, our solutions are not limited to RBAT
only.
1.4 Research Methodology
Recall that this study aims to check the feasibility of the application of MapReduce in
design of a transaction data anonymization solution that is scalable to large data and
achieves the required level of privacy without significant loss of utility. We perform
our study in the following sequential steps.
1. The first and foremost step towards the design of scalable transaction data anonym-
ization is to design a partitioning strategy. RBAT has more than one inputs that can
be considered for partitioning. There can be more than one way to partition an input
and to represent the partitions in the memory of the assigned nodes. Also, different
partitioning methods can have different effects on the anonymized results as well as
the level of parallelization that can be achieved. Therefore, we design a partitioning
method by studying different possible partitioning methods and identifying their effect
on the anoymized results and on the level of parallelization that can be achieved.
2. Next, we design the parallelelization of RBAT. To carry this out, we first identify
the high-level steps that must be kept intact to ensure that the same anonymized results
can be achieved as RBAT does. For each step, we design its parallel implementation
by partitioning data and performing the key operations using MapReduce.
3. Finally, we experimentally evaluate our implementation over a physical cluster. We
mainly measure the scalability with respect to large problem instances and the physical
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resources available. We also analyse the performance and identify any bottlenecks that
may have arisen due to the design constraints, imposed by MapReduce.
1.5 Research Challenges
Parallelizing a set-based generalization method such as RBAT on MapReduce is chal-
lenging, and the following issues need to be tackled:
1. Data Partitioning is important to any algorithm that attempts to process a large
amount of data in parallel and it is important to the parallelization of RBAT
too. Partitioning must allow to deal with large problem instances in a scalable
way and the workload among processing nodes must be balanced. Transaction
datasets often are large and contain varying numbers of items in each record.
Therefore, even when the number of records are equally split among partitions,
the workload associated with each partition may not be fairly distributed. In
MapReduce, parallel tasks are created typically by partitioning one input and all
other inputs need to be replicated to each processing node [23]. Dealing with
large problem instances consisting of large transaction records or the domain of
items is challenging.
2. Most of the computations in set-based generalization methods such as RBAT re-
quire a global view of data. A MapReduce computation usually consists of a
sequence of two key computational stages: Map and Reduce. The communic-
ation among processing node during these stages is not allowed except at the
end of the map stage. If the computations assigned to a processing node are de-
pendent on the data assigned to the other nodes, most of the data will need to be
communicated to the reduce stage via network interconnection. Communicating
such a large amount of data can incur high communication cost and may result
in ineffective resource utilization. Therefore careful partitioning and placement
of input is required.
1.6 Contribution 10
3. RBAT is a good representative of iterative transaction data anonymization. The
method iterates until the solution gives the required privacy level with best pos-
sible utility based on some heuristics. Each iteration consists of a number of
iterative steps. To ensure good utility of data, these steps must be performed in
sequence. In MapReduce, no data is kept between any iterations. Each itera-
tion requires to set up parallel tasks and to re-load data associated to the tasks.
Designing a performance-effective solution is not straightforward.
4. Parallelization may also affect the utility of anonymized data. If the scalabil-
ity achieved is at the cost of sacrificing a large amount of data utility, then the
anonymized results may not be usable, rendering our algorithm ineffective.
1.6 Contribution
In this work, we address the challenges described in the previous section. In particular,
we make the following contributions:
1. We propose a partitioning scheme for transaction data. The method does not
put any restriction on the number or size of any partitions and allows to balance
the workload associated with each partition even when the datasets consist of
transaction records of varying sizes. It partitions more than one input and hence
allows to deal with problem instances consisting of a large number of transaction
records or domain of items. This is useful for achieving scalability. Our parti-
tioning does not require a large amount of data to be communicated among ma-
chines and therefore does not incur high network cost. Our partitioning scheme
also represents data in a way so that the required computations are performed
efficiently.
2. We propose two parallelizations of RBAT: direct parallelization and loop-controlled
parallelization. The direct parallelization implements RBAT on MapReduce by
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mainly partitioning data in order to achieve scalability. Our experimental study
shows that the method is scalable but its performance can be even worse than
its sequential counterpart due to large parallelism overhead. The loop-controlled
parallelization deals with the parallelism overhead and addresses the perform-
ance bottlenecks of our direct parallel method. Our method is based on the idea
that increasing the number of MapReduce rounds increases the level of syn-
chronization during anonymization operations but decreases the communication
cost at each MapReduce round, whereas decreasing the number of rounds to be
employed will incur less parallelism overhead but increases the amount of com-
putations during each MapReduce round. Our loop-controlled method general-
izes the direct parallel method and allows to control the number of MapReduce
rounds to be employed at each iteration of the anonymization process.
3. We evaluate our design on real-world transaction datasets using a commodity
cluster. Our experimental results show that our loop-controlled method can scale
linearly to large datasets, and nearly linear to cluster sizes. Our method can
perform nearly 9 times faster than RBAT using a cluster of 14 processing nodes
while retaining almost the same level of utility as RBAT does.
1.7 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 surveys the existing work relevant to our problem of large-scale transaction
data anonymization. We briefly discuss the existing transaction data anonymization
methods, and review different techniques used to address the scalability issues of data
anonymization in centralized settings. The application of MapReduce for privacy-
preserving data publishing and other areas are also surveyed.
Chapter 3 gives the background necessary to understanding our work. We define rel-
evant concepts and introduce some important notations. This is followed by a brief
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overview of RBAT and MapReduce. We also present a framework where general is-
sues concerning the parallelization of a method such as RBAT on MapReduce will be
discussed.
Chapter 4 describes a direct parallelization of RBAT using MapReduce. We give
detailed description of our data partitioning and representation mechanism, and our
MapReduce-based design for RBAT. We experimentally evaluate the scalability of our
method over large data volumes of up to 128 million real-world transaction records us-
ing a commodity cluster consisting of 14 homogenous slave nodes and a master node.
Chapter 5 analyses in detail the performance bottlenecks that arise from the direct
parallelization of RBAT presented in Chapter 4. We present our loop-controlled paral-
lelism to deal with these performance bottlenecks. We also present the details of the
solution to deal with these performance bottlenecks. We give an analytical model to es-
timate the performance of our proposed method. We test the scalability of our method
on various data volumes and available resources.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and presents some possible future research directions
for our work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter will review the existing literature relevant to our problem of anonymizing
large transaction data. We first review the existing works on transaction data anonym-
ization, then techniques used by existing sequential methods to address the problem
of scalable anonymization. We also study the application of MapReduce in different
applications including privacy preservation methods.
2.1 Transaction data anonymization
There are considerable research efforts for designing privacy-preserving data publish-
ing methods [36, 2]. Privacy-preserving data publishing aims to protect the privacy of
individuals whose records are contained in the released data. One way to achieve this
is to anonymize data, before releasing the data to untrusted recipients. The anonym-
ization techniques typically transform the data in a way that the published records are
protected against identity and sensitive information disclosure attacks [34].
Existing data anonymization methods mostly differ in two important aspects: privacy
protection and utility preservation. A method must ensure that the anonymized data
is protected against the disclosure of identity and the sensitive information contained
in their records. But this must not be at the cost of high data utility loss. A method
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that gives maximum possible privacy protection but distorts the data significantly, may
result in the published data far from serving the purpose of its release. Therefore,
some tradeoff between privacy and utility must be made. The privacy and utility level
achieved by an anonymization method is determined by the privacy model and the
anonymization techniques used.
A privacy model defines the constraints of privacy protection. For example, k-anonymity
[110] requires that the probability of an individual being uniquely identified in the
released data is no more than 1
k
. Other privacy models include l-diversity [76], t-
closeness [68], δ-presence [86], (c,t)-isolation [14], (a,k)-anonymity [129], (c, l)-
diversity, confidence bounding [125, 124] and -differential privacy [26, 25]. These
privacy models cannot be trivially adopted to anonymize transaction data, as transac-
tion records do not follow a small fixed schema and each record is a subset of items
usually drawn from a large domain. So applying these privacy principles to transaction
data may cause high information loss, which can render the anonymized data useless
[39, 75]. Therefore, a different set of privacy models, considering specifically the
characteristics of transaction data, were proposed. For example, km-anonymity [114],
(h, k, p)-coherence [132], complete k-anonymity [51], and ρ-uncertainty [12].
An anonymization technique is used to transform data in order to satisfy a privacy
model. Several data anonymization techniques exist: generalization [35, 109, 126, 56],
suppression [109, 56], perturbation [100, 18] and dissociation [40, 117]. Generaliza-
tion [35, 109, 126, 56] transform data by replacing a value with a more generalized
but consistent value. Suppression [109, 56] anonymizes data by removing a value or
a record. Perturbation [100, 18] distorts the data by adding noise, swapping values,
or generating synthetic data based on some statistical properties of the original data.
Dissociation [40, 117] dissociates the relationship between sensitive and non-sensitive
items. These techniques have implications on the privacy and utility achieved. For
example, suppressing the values or the records gives high privacy protection but may
also cause high data distortion. Perturbation preserves statistical information and the
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anonymized data can be used to build data mining models accurately but noise addition
falsifies the information contained at record-level. Hence, the anonymized results are
limited in their applications. For example, when biomedical studies [72, 34] require
analyses to be made at record-level, such perturbed data may not be useful. In this
thesis, we consider the methods based on generalization since they provide good util-
ity of data and retain the original information at record-level. In the following, we will
discuss these methods and the level of privacy and utility they provide in detail.
2.1.1 Generalization-based Transaction Data Anonymization
Different generalization-based methods exist for transaction data anonymization [72,
114, 132, 51, 115, 70, 12, 73]. These methods achieve the required privacy by repla-
cing an item with its generalized representation containing less specific information.
Generalization may be performed by allowing different occurrences of an original item
to be mapped to different generalized items. Such generalization is called Local Gen-
eralization. For example, consider 2-anonymizing the dataset shown in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.1: An example hierarchy
Using the hierarchy shown in Figure 2.1, the anonymized form of Table 2.1 using local
generalization is shown in Table 2.2. Note that the occurrences of items a and b are
intact in the last three transaction records whereas the same items are replaced by their
generalized representation A in the first two transaction records.
Global generalization forces all the occurrences of an item to have only one generalized
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TID Items
1 a
2 a, b
3 a, b, d
4 a, b, c, d
5 a, b, d
Table 2.1: An example dataset
TID Items
1 A
2 A
3 a, b, B
4 a, b, B
5 a, b, B
Table 2.2: A 2-anonymized dataset using local generalization
representation. For example, 2-anonymized form of Table 2.1 using global generaliza-
tion is given in Table 2.3.
TID Items
1 A
2 A
3 A, B
4 A, B
5 A, B
Table 2.3: A 2-anonymized dataset using global generalization
Below, we survey some local and global generalization methods for transaction data
anonymization.
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Local Generalization-based Methods
He et al. [51] and Terrovitis et al. [115] proposed local-generalization based methods
to achieve complete k-anonymity and km-anonymity.
He et al. [51] proposed a top-down greedy partitioning method, which uses local gen-
eralization to achieve k-anonymity for transaction data. The method starts with all
the transaction records creating a single partition. It then splits each partition into
sub-partitions, until no split can be performed without violating the required privacy
protection. Logically, each partition represents a generalized representation, corres-
ponding to a level in given generalization hierarchy. Every time when a partition is
to be split, one of the generalized item associated with the partition is specialized to
its child nodes in the hierarchy. The choice of the generalized item is made greedily,
depending on which specialization causes maximum information gain. This requires
iterating over all the generalized items associated with the partition and computing the
information gain as a result of specialization. The method terminates when no partition
can further be split without violating the privacy protection requirement.
Terrovitis et al. [115] proposed a local recoding method, which sorts the records and
partition them into n parts. Each part is anonymized independently using their pro-
posed Apriori anonymization method to achieve km-anonymity. The whole process
generalizes the dataset progressively in m iterations. That is, the ith iteration ensures
that the anonymized data achieves ki-anonymity. This is done by computing the num-
ber of occurrences of all itemsets of size i and finding the unprotected itemsets in given
datasets. For each itemset found unprotected, the algorithm attempts to find a general-
ized representation that makes the itemset protected and causes minimum information
loss. To make the count of occurrences of the itemsets efficiently and reducing memory
requirements, the algorithm scans the whole dataset at the beginning of each iteration
and constructs a count tree, similar to a FP-tree [48].
Local generalization potentially causes less data distortion than global generalization.
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However, the inconsistent generalization of items in a dataset may result in derivation
of inaccurate results [34, 75]. Also, all the existing local recoding methods achieve
privacy protection against identity disclosure attack and are not trivial to extend them
for protection against sensitive itemset disclosure. The methods are also based on the
models with some uniform privacy assumptions and therefore may excessively distort
the data. For example, complete k-anonymity is based on the assumption the itemsets
of all sizes in given dataset need to be protected. Therefore, the model requires that
each transaction record must be identical to (k−1) other transaction records. Similarly,
km-anonymity requires that all itemsets of size m must be contained by at least k
transaction records.
The MapReduce realization of such local generalization methods is relatively trivial,
since the algorithms recode data chunks independently. However, the issues such as
dealing with the large domain of items may still need to be addressed. For example,
an ith iteration of apriori anonymization [115] constructs a count tree, containing all
possible itemsets of size i and their possible generalizations. Similarly, the partitioning
method proposed in [51] requires the taxonomy tree to be loaded into the memory,
while anonymizing each partition.
Global Generalization-based Methods
Anonymization methods employing global generalization has also been proposed. Some
of these methods find the anonymized solution by replacing one or more items by any
of their ancestor nodes in the hierarchy. Other methods do not require any gener-
alization hierarchy and the generalized representation is created dynamically by the
methods.
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Hierarchy-based Methods
Terrovitis et al. [114] designed a global generalization-based method to achieve km-
anonymity. Their method works in bottom-up fashion. Starting from original items,
the algorithm performsm iterations, protecting increasingly large combination of items
in each iteration. During each iteration, the unprotected combinations of certain size
are protected by replacing a group of items by a more generalized item using a given
generalization hierarchy. For each unprotected combination of items, the algorithm
examines all possible generalizations and finds one that incurs the least information
loss and satisfies km-anonymity.
Hierarchy-based generalization have also been integrated with suppression by some
works [70, 12]. Liu et al. [70] proposed a top-down greedy method which replaces a
set of public items with their generalized representations and suppresses some items to
enforce km-anonymity. Starting with the most generalized cut, which is to generalize
all the items to the root of a given taxonomy tree, the algorithm greedily attempts to
find a more specialized cut, giving the required privacy protection while incurring less
information loss, until no such specialization is found. To find a specialized cut, the
method evaluates all possible nodes of the current cut and specializes the node causing
maximum information gain due to specialization and incurring minimum suppression
cost. The suppressions, required for a given generalization cut, is also determined by
greedily constructing a tree in top-down manner which starts by assuming that all items
are to be suppressed and iteratively removes an item from the suppression list, which
is the most promising in terms of privacy and utility. For performance reasons, the
algorithm works in m rounds to progressively protect the unprotected combination of
items. That is, at an ith round, it ensures to achieve ki-anonymity. Cao et al. [12] pro-
posed ρ-uncertainty, a model to limit the probability of inferring any non-public item,
given that the attacker may know any sensitive and non-sensitive items of a record. The
potential set of sensitive inferences are framed as sensitive association rules, with a set
of items as antecedent assumed to constitute the background knowledge of an attacker.
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They also proposed a top-down algorithm to achieve this. The method first iteratively
suppresses non-public itemsets to control the confidence of the rules involving sensit-
ive items only, and then generalizes public items to ensure that no sensitive association
rule has confidence greater than ρ. The generalization starts with all non-sensitive items
mapped to the most generalized item in a given hierarchy. The algorithm then iterat-
ively specializes a generalized item causing maximum possible information gain, until
no information gain can be harnessed anymore, without violating the ρ-uncertainty.
Set-based Generalization Methods
All the methods discussed in the previous section require the use of a generalization
hierarchy. In such methods, if an original item is generalized to any of its ancestors,
all of its siblings are forced to be generalized to that common ancestor in the hierarchy
too. This limits the search space considered by these methods. Another set of methods
overcomes this limitation by using set-based generalization, which is to replace a com-
bination of original items with their set representation. Set-based generalization was
first introduced by Li et al. [69] to anonymize transaction data, and has been shown to
retain utility better, since it allows to explore a larger search space [75, 69, 73].
Loukides et al. [73] also showed that full-subtree recoding is a specific case of set-
based generalization, where the generalizations that original items are mapped to are
restricted to their ancestors in a given taxonomy tree. So the methods based on set-
based generalization can also be restricted to find a solution based on the given tax-
onomy tree. The method proposed by Loukides et al. [73] is one such example.
They proposed a constraint-based k-anonymity model that allows to specify privacy
and utility constraints and proposed a heuristic, constraint-based anonymization of
transactions (COAT), which protects transaction records by ensuring that all poten-
tially linkable itemsets (specified by the privacy constraints) appear at least in k trans-
action records, using allowable generalizations (specified by the utility constraints).
To achieve this, COAT iteratively performs the anonymization. During each iteration,
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it finds and protects an unprotected privacy constraint whose itemset specified in the
privacy constraint appears most frequently in given dataset. To protect a privacy con-
straint, the algorithm iteratively selects an item from the itemset specified in the privacy
constraint that appears least frequently and generalizes it. The generalization is made
using the generalization incurring minimum information loss from all allowable gen-
eralizations, specified by the utility constraints and suppresses it if no utility constraint
exists to generalize it any further. The algorithm continues generalizing or suppressing
items, until the current privacy constraint is protected and then moves on to the next
unprotected privacy constraint. The algorithm stops when all the privacy constraints
are protected. The method does not require a hierarchy for generalization. The pri-
vacy protection is achieved by a constraint specification model which allows to specify
the privacy requirements and does not make any assumption on the number or size of
itemsets to be protected. However, the model anonymizes data based on the utility
constraints. This may result in the anonymization solution with good data utility for
intended utility requirements and may ignore the anonymization solution which gives
better utility in general.
Loukides et al. [74] proposed PS-rules model which allows to specify the privacy
constraints, and Rule-Based Anonymization of Transaction data (RBAT), a top-down
specialization method which generalizes given transaction data to protect the PS-rules.
As shown by Table 2.4, comparing to other methods, RBAT has some desirable fea-
tures. For example, it ensures the protection against both identity and sensitive itemset
disclosure attacks. The method does not require a generalization hierarchy. The PS-
rules model [74, 75] allows privacy constraints to be specified, and does not make any
assumption about the privacy constraints such as the itemsets of certain size must be
protected. Therefore, it provides good data utility.
RBAT is also a good representative of other global anonymization methods. For ex-
ample, global anonymization methods are mostly iterative and each iteration involves
a number of anonymization operations to be performed in sequence. RBAT can also be
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used to achieve the privacy constraints specified by most of the other transaction data
anonymization models such as km-anonymity [114], (h, k, p)-Coherence [132], com-
plete k-anonymity [51], and ρ-uncertainty [12]. For example, specifying the privacy
constraints consisting of all itemsets of size m using PS-rules and setting RBAT to
achieve identity disclosure only, will allow to achieve the km-anonymity. We therefore
consider the parallelization of RBAT in this work.
2.2 Non-Parallel Methods for Scalable Data Anonym-
ization
The scalable anonymization of large transaction data has been considered in central-
ised settings. Data indexing and sampling are two commonly used techniques. Disk-
based methods with external indexing is one way considered by existing methods.
Iwuchukwu et al. [55] proposed the application of spatial indexing to k-anonymizing
data. The proposed method uses a multi-dimensional R-tree. Each node in the tree rep-
resents a generalized representation. A path from the root node to a leaf node produces
a set of records in a given dataset that satisfy the generalization constraints imposed by
the path followed to reach the leaf node. For example, consider 3-anonymizing a rela-
tional dataset shown in Table 2.5. The possible R-tree constructed is shown in Figure
2.2.
LeFevre et al. [63] also proposed a technique for scaling an existing generalization
method, Mondrian [64], to datasets larger than the available memory. The algorithm is
based on the idea of decision tree construction method, RainForest [37]. Starting with
all attribute values generalised to the root, the algorithm scans the input dataset D to
collect some statistics (depending on the split criteria), and creates a frequency group.
It then chooses an allowable split attribute based on this frequency group. D is scanned
again to create m partitions based on the split attribute. The partitions are written to
the disk, if they are larger than available memory. The process is recursively repeated
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Method Search method Techni -
ques
Privacy Model Attacks Hierarchy-based Privacy
As-
sump-
tions
RBAT [72] Top-Down Global
General-
ization
PS-rules Both no User-
specified
Con-
straints
AA [114] Bottom-up Global
General-
ization
km-anonymity Identity Disclosure yes All
m-sized
itemsets
need to
be pro-
tected
Greedy [132] Bottom-up Local
General-
ization
km-anonymity Identity Disclosure yes All m-
itemsets
are to be
protec-
ted
Anonymize [51] Top-Down Local
General-
ization
k-anonymity Identity Disclosure yes All
itemsets
need to
be pro-
tected
LRA [115] Bottom-up Local
General-
ization
km-anonymity Identity Disclosure yes All m-
itemsets
are to be
protec-
ted
mHgHs [70] Top-Down Global
General-
ization+
Suppres-
sion
km-anonymity Identity Disclosure yes All m-
itemsets
are to be
protec-
ted.
TDControl [12] Top-Down Global
General-
ization+
Suppres-
sion
ρ-uncertainty Sensitive Itemset Disclosure yes All
sensitive
asso-
ciation
rules
must be
protec-
ted.
COAT [73] Iterative Global
General-
ization+
Suppres-
sion
Privacy and utility specification Identity Disclosure no utility
require-
ments
specific-
ation
Table 2.4: Comparision of transaction data anonymization methods
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Figure 2.2: A example R-tree for k-anonymous data
ID Age Sex
1 21 F
2 22 F
3 35 F
4 36 M
5 45 M
6 55 M
Table 2.5: An example Dataset T
in depth-first manner, until no split is possible. Using such disk-based approaches
with high-speed disks may address the problem of anonymizing data larger than main
memory but these disk-based methods in general limit the performance of the method,
to the capabilities of current hardware technologies such as disk I/O speed. Also, the
use of resources will still be limited to the processing and storage capability of a single
machine. For example, accessing a large amount of data from disks frequently may
lead to a performance bottleneck. Therefore, dealing with increasing scale of data
using disk-based methods may not be promising in terms of scalability.
The use of sampling techniques have also been considered by some works [63, 65, 75].
Lefevre et al. [63] proposed the use of random sampling for scalable k-anonymization
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Figure 2.3: A example 2-anonymous data using Mondrian
of relational data. The method scans the input data and generates a random sample
that fits in the available memory and applies the Mondrian method to anonymize the
data. The sample is used to construct the partition tree by choosing the allowable splits.
For example, consider a sample of six records used to create a partition tree as shown
in Figure 2.3. The data sample is first partitioned vertically across the sex attribute
and then horizontally across the age attribute. This creates three different partitions
satisfying 2-anonymity. The partition tree created by the sample is used to anonymize
original data and any splits violating the privacy constraints are undone. Most closely
related to our work is the sampling-based method proposed by Loukides et al. [75]
to anonymize transaction data. The algorithm uses top-down specialization. It selects
a random sample of pre-determined size. Starting with all the items mapped to the
most generalized item, it recursively performs specializations until no specialization
can be made without violating any privacy constraint. Each time, a specialization
operation is performed, the privacy constraints are checked using the sample. The
set of generalizations acquired using the sample are then revised using the top-down
and bottom-up cut-revision phases. The top-down revision phase further attempts to
specialize the generalized items in order to find a solution with same privacy level
but better utility. The bottom up cut-revision phase ensures the privacy protection
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by generalizing the items further, if the anonymized solution found using the sample
does not give the required privacy protection for the whole dataset. Although the above
approaches solve the problem of the limitations put by disk-based methods, the privacy
and utility achieved by the anonymized solution using the sample may not guarantee
the same level of privacy and utility for the original data. Therefore, the anonymized
solution may need to be revised using the whole dataset.
2.3 Possible Choices for Parallelization
There are two important aspects of a parallel system: an algorithm for carrying out
the computation in parallel and the parallel model used for its design. The choice of a
parallel model affects the way the parallel algorithms are designed and help determines
their different characteristics such as parallelism overhead, degree of parallelism etc.
According to the existing work [104, 106, 11], a parallel model must be general enough
to model a range of physical architectures. This makes the parallel solutions portable to
various architectures. The cost of the algorithms estimated using a parallel model must
not differ too much from its cost in practice on the targeted physical architectures. The
model must also be manageable. That is, it must abstract the details such as parallelism,
communication, synchronization etc.
Several parallel architectures exist [11, 66, 130] supported by different parallel models.
Based on characteristics such as the instructions and the data processing patterns, Flyyn
[32] broadly classified these architectures into four categories: SISD (Single Instruc-
tion, Single Data Stream), SIMD (Single Instruction, Multiple Data Stream), MISD
(Multiple Instruction, Single Data Stream) and MIMD (Multiple Instruction, Multiple
Data Stream). Two important families of these parallel architectures suitable to our
problem of large-scale data processing are SIMD and MIMD. For example, a cluster
of workstations or massive parallel processor allows the use of multiple processors
to perform large-scale computations in parallel. Below, we survey some important
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parallel models supported by these classes of physical architectures and analyse their
characteristics.
2.3.1 PRAM
Fortune and Wyllie [33] proposed PRAM (Parallel Random Access Machine), a paral-
lel extension of the random access machine model. It consists of an unbounded number
of processors, each with its own local set of registers. All the processors are connected
to an unbounded global memory, shared among the processors via which they commu-
nicate. A PRAM processing cycle consists of a number of time steps. During a unit
time step, each processor may read any data from global memory into its local register
set, perform any computations over the data stored in its local registers and write any
data to the shared memory.
Although the model is simple to adopt and had led itself to be a widely accepted re-
search tool, as evidenced by a number of solutions designed based on it [59], the model
is based on some unrealistic assumptions and neglects some practical issues. For ex-
ample, the cost of a PRAM algorithm assumes that cost incurred by a processor to
access its local registers and the cost to perform inter-processor communication is the
same. All processors are also assumed to work synchronously. Therefore, the perform-
ance of the parallel solutions in practice may be far worse than estimated at the time of
their design [41, 20].
2.3.2 BSP
Valient [121] proposed the BSP (Barrier Synchronous Parallel) model, in an attempt to
overcome the unrealistic assumptions made by PRAM about the physical characterist-
ics of the underlying architecture. The model assumes the use of two-level memory:
local and global. It also differentiates the costs associated with accessing local memory
and global memory. A BSP system consists of a number of components, each of which
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is assumed to have a processor and a local memory associated with it. All the compon-
ents are assumed to be connected to all other processors via some means of point-to-
point communication.
The computation consists of a sequence of steps called supersteps. During a superstep,
each component performs its assigned tasks locally and any necessary communication
with other components. Every l time steps, a global check is made to determine if the
current superstep is completed by all the participating components. If all the tasks of
current superstep is finished, the components are synchronized and moved to the next
superstep. Otherwise, the system waits for another l time steps to allow the completion
of unfinished tasks of the current superstep.
The model takes into account the different characteristics related to parallel design
and the physical architecture used such as computational cost, communication and
synchronization cost, bandwidth inefficiency etc., so the estimated performance of the
parallel method on any given architectural settings is more predictable than PRAM.
The parallel programs written in different implementations of BSP are portable to vari-
ous architectures [105, 45]. However, the implementations of the model still require
specifications related to parallel execution such as synchronization etc.
2.3.3 MapReduce
Dean et al. [22] proposed MapReduce for large-scale data processing in parallel. It
simplifies the design of the scalable solutions for processing a large amount of data, by
hiding lower-level details of parallel execution such as fault-tolerance, load balancing
and synchronization.
MapReduce follows the client/server architecture. One of the machines works as a
master node which performs scheduling of tasks, coordinates the distribution of data to
the worker nodes and holds, all the book-keeping about the workers, jobs and the data.
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Each client node is assumed to have its own local memory and a global distributed
memory shared among all nodes.
Working Mechanism: A MapReduce computation consists of a number of MapRe-
duce rounds. Each MapReduce round consists of two computational stages called Map
and Reduce, intermediated by a communication stage called Shuffle. An schematic
representation of a typical MapReduce round is shown in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: A schematic representation of a MapReduce round
The map/reduce computations take input and produce output as a set of key/value pairs.
The input and output are usually stored in a distributed file system [38]. A typical
MapReduce cluster consists of a single master node (computer) which schedules and
monitors different map/reduce data processing tasks over the slave nodes. Concep-
tually, a MapReduce round consists of map, shuffle and reduce phases, and can be
expressed as:
Map(k1, v1)→ list(k2, v2)
Reduce(k2, list(v2))→ list(k3, v3)
In the Map stage, the given data are logically partitioned into a number of disjoint sub-
sets and each subset is assigned to a mapper. The assignment of partitions to mappers
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is made dynamically and is determined at runtime. A mapper (in parallel to other map-
pers) reads a record in the form (k1, v1) from its assigned data partition, performs the
user-specified computation, and outputs another set list(k2, v2). If a mapper runs out
of memory at this stage, the part of output is temporarily moved to the local file system
(LFS).
The output pairs produced by mappers (intermediate output) go through a shuffle
phase. At this stage, each mapper locally performs the partitioning of its output. Given
r reducers, the key space of intermediate output is divided into r partitions in a way
each partition has almost an equal number of distinct keys. This is to ensure that the
amount of work associated with each partition is approximately the same. The parti-
tioning is usually done via a hash function h on a key k of each pair, i.e. h(k) mod r.
This ensures that the pairs with the same key from different mappers are assigned to a
single reducer. The partitioning strategy is based on the assumption that the amount of
work associated with each key of intermediate output is the same. Note that a mapper
output may not be local to its assigned reducer. In this case, shuffle also involves trans-
ferring mapper output to a reducer over the network. The shuffle phase starts as soon
as the first mapper finishes its processing, so it may overlap with the map phase.
A reducer ri acquires its assigned part of map output by copying the pairs (k2, v2) from
bi,j , an ith partition from the jth mapper (1 ≤ j ≤ M ), sorts all the assigned pairs
by their keys to construct (k2, list(v2)) and processes list(v2) for each distinct key k2
using a user-specified reduce function. The output produced by the reduce phase can
be the final output or can be input to another mapper in the next MapReduce round.
It is worth noting that there is an overhead for achieving parallelization in MapReduce.
This mostly consists of the cost of initializing a MapReduce job, I/O cost of reading
input and writing output by mappers and reducers during the map and reduce stages,
and the cost of shuffling mapper output over the network to reducers. It is also worth
observing that output produced by mappers is an input to reducers, which is transferred
via shuffle phase. Therefore, less the intermediate output produced by the map stage,
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the lower the cost of transferring it over the network will be and the lower the I/O cost
of writing intermediate output and reading input by the mappers and reducers will be.
The number of mappers and reducers must also be specified based on the available
resources. Setting them to a high value may result in a small amount of work for each
mapper or reducer, and the performance gain by parallel processing may be offset by
their setup cost. Setting them to a low value on the other hand, may result in ineffective
resource utilization.
Example 1. Consider a simple word count using MapReduce. A given text is divided
into M = 3 chunks and assigned to mappers. During the map stage, a mapper is
assigned a chunk of text. Each ith line of the assigned chunk is read in the form of a
pair 〈i, li〉, where li represents the contents of ith line in the partition. It then counts the
occurrences of each distinct word in li, and outputs 〈word, occurrencesj〉 for each dis-
tinct word. Once the lines are processed, the output pairs of each mapper are divided
into r = 2 partitions. For each map output pair 〈word, occurrencesj〉, it computes
h(word) mod r to decide to which of the two reducers the pair is sent to. The pairs
are then copied to their assigned reducers. A reducer sums up all local occurrencesj
(1 ≤ j ≤M ) of a word, and outputs the global count 〈word, occurence〉.
MapReduce and other Parallel Architectures: Mapreduce was originally designed
to run on a large cluster of commodity machines, but later was also adopted to other
parallel architectures. Some existing works [49, 108, 16] proposed a design and im-
plementation of MapReduce over graphics processing unit (GPU) clusters. Chen et
al. [17] attempted to scale up MapReduce applications by proposing a number of
work partitioning schemes which leverages both CPUs and GPUs to perform the given
computations in parallel. Karloff et al. [58] and Goodrich et al. [44] showed that
MapReduce can also be used to simulate PRAM and BSP models.
Unlike other parallel models such as BSP, MapReduce was not introduced with any
formal cost estimation formulation. Therefore, an analytical study taking into account
the characteristics of physical architecture and the given problem instance is needed to
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help predict the cost of a parallel solution.
2.4 MapReduce and Privacy Protection
The privacy protection using MapReduce has recently been considered. Some methods
allow the computations to be performed using MapReduce while controlling the access
to original data or the sensitive information therein. Roy et al. [102] proposed Air-
avat, a MapReduce-based system that ensures security and privacy guarantees, when
the distributed computations are performed over sensitive data stored in a cloud. The
system prevents the information leakage which might occur due to access available
to original data or output of the computation performed by the untrusted data users.
The privacy and security is achieved by enforcing access control policies over the data
access via system resources such as network connections or storage channels and by
also ensuring that the output of the computations are differentially private [26]. Zhang
et al. [136] studied the problem of performing MapReduce-based computations over
hybrid clouds. They adopted MapReduce to perform secure computations using the
non-sensitive data in public clouds and the sensitive data in private clouds. They pro-
posed Sediac, a MapReduce-based system which partitions a computing job according
to the required privacy level. The tasks performing computations over public data are
scheduled on a public cloud and those processing private data always stay on a private
cloud. A two-stage process is used to aggregate the results. In the first stage, the public
and private clouds individually perform their local aggregation. The aggregated res-
ults from public clouds are then brought to private cloud for final aggregation. The
use of cryptographic methods to perform information-retrieval operations in a privacy-
preserving way using MapReduce has also been considered. Blass et al. [7] proposed a
MapReduce-based privacy-preserving method to search words from the data stored in
public clouds in encrypted form. During the map stage, each node performs the search
over encrypted data using an instance of private information retrieval method on its
assigned data partition. The intermediate search results are aggregated by the reduce
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phase. Mayberry et al. [78] proposed a MapReduce-based solution to the problem of
protecting the privacy of cloud users from untrusted cloud providers. More specific-
ally, they proposed a method to protect the information leakage about the data access
patterns of cloud users. Given n files stored in a cloud, their MapReduce-based imple-
mentation of a private information retrieval protocol allows an encrypted query to be
performed over distributed data in a way that the information about which files were
accessed is not disclosed to the cloud provider. All these privacy-preserving meth-
ods focus on the privacy and security concerning data sharing over clouds rather than
focusing on achieving scalability. These methods also make different privacy assump-
tions and can not be adopted to our scenario. For example, adopting the access control
method will need to limit the access of data to trusted users and is orthogonal to our
scenario of releasing data to untrusted recipients.
Leveraging MapReduce to address scalability issues in privacy-preserving methods
has also recently been investigated. Zhang et al. [137] proposed a MapReduce-based
local recoding method to k-anonymize the data to prevent proximity privacy attacks
[127], which happens when the sensitive values in an anonymized group are not di-
verse enough. The proposed method uses clustering and consists of two phases. The
first phase uses a method similar to Lloyd’s k-means clustering [71] and partitions data-
set into a pre-defined number of partitions so that records with similar non-sensitive at-
tribute values and contain semantically distant sensitive values are placed in the same
partition. During the second stage, each partition is assigned to a worker node, which
then uses complete linkage agglomerative clustering to produce groups of records, each
of size at least k. The non-sensitive attribute values in each group are replaced by their
most generalized representation in the group. The groups from all the worker nodes are
finally combined to form the anonymized dataset. Since the partitioning is made based
on the data distribution, the created partitions may not be balanced in the associated
workload.
More closely related to our work are the MapReduce-based top-down [139] and bottom-
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up [138] methods to achieve k-anonymity. The top-down specialization method pro-
posed by Zhang et al. [139] partitions data into a number of partitions by randomly
assigning records to the partitions. All partitions are then anonymized in parallel. Each
partition is anonymized by a number of worker nodes using a MapReduce-based top-
down specialization job. To ensure that all the data partitions achieve the same level
of anonymization, the algorithm merges all the generalization cuts into a single most
generalized cut, by choosing the most generalized representation of an attribute value
used in any of the data partitions. Zhang et al. [138] proposed a MapReduce-based im-
plementation of bottom-up generalization method. Starting from the original attribute
values, the algorithm iteratively finds the best generalization and updates the anonym-
ized dataset accordingly, until all the generalizations occur in no less than k records. To
find the best generalization candidate, the algorithm scans the dataset and collects the
required statistics in a single MapReduce round. Similar to our method, the algorithm
performs all the computations requiring full data scan in parallel and keeps the updated
anonymization level which is used to construct the anonymized dataset in the end us-
ing single MapReduce round. But this may lead to poor performance, as evidenced
by our preliminary experiments (Section 4.4). Also, all the methods are for relational
data so do not take into account the characteristics of transaction data. Furthermore,
these method also achieve k-anonymity. Unlike k-anonymity however, the models for
protecting sensitive information disclosure do not have the property of monotonicity.
That is, achieving the required protection on individual data partitions may not guar-
antee the same or higher protection level on the overall dataset. So such methods can
not trivially be extended to achieve the protection against both types of disclosure.
2.5 Other applications of MapReduce
MapReduce has been adopted to address scalable data processing in various applica-
tions [67, 99, 94, 29]. Despite its wide-spread adoption, its simplicity introduces some
limitations in the way the processing must be performed. This often causes degraded
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performance to an unacceptable level when performing various processing tasks [23].
In the following, we highlight some of these limitation and describe possible solutions
in the light of existing applications.
Load balancing: In order to achieve the effective resource utilization, workload
balance among processing nodes is important. In MapReduce, the parallel tasks are
performed at both the map and reduce stages. These tasks are created by partitioning
input data at the map and reduce stages respectively. Therefore, workload balancing
must be done at both stages.
Existing methods employ different load balancing strategies. Okcan et al. [89] pro-
posed a randomized method to map an arbitrary join condition to MapReduce with the
goal of balancing workload among reducers. Given two datasets S and T to join based
on an arbitrary condition θ, the algorithm first constructs a |S| × |T | matrix, with an
entry Mi,j set to true if the ith record (1 ≤ i ≤ |S|) of S and jth record (1 ≤ j ≤ |T |)
of T satisfies θ condition. The records corresponding to the entries satisfying the con-
dition are then mapped to reducers in a way that all reducers get an equal number of
records. Finally, the reducers generate output pairs of the joined records. Vernica et
al. [123] studied the problem of finding similar pairs of records from a dataset using
MapReduce. The method first reads the input records in parallel and produces a list
of tokens (words) that appear in the join-attribute value ordered in ascending order of
their frequency. The map stage of the second stage orders the tokens of each record in
ascending order of their global frequency using the frequency list created in the pre-
vious stage and creates a prefix of size k. For example, consider an ordered record
{call, back, I, will} with the token call appearing least frequently in the given dataset.
The prefix of size 2 is {call, back}. The records with at least one common token in
their prefixes are sent to the same reducer to perform the join operation. Using the
least frequent tokens of records as their prefixes will eliminate the skew which could
have arisen due to the presence of frequent tokens. This results in workload balance
among reducers.
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Communication among processing nodes: MapReduce provides limited commu-
nication among processing nodes. At each MapReduce round, the processing nodes
are not allowed to communicate with each other during the map and reduce stages ex-
cept at the shuffle stage. That is, when a processing node finishes its assigned map
tasks, the map output is sent to the reduce tasks for further processing.
The lack of communication among the nodes may cause a large amount of data to
be shuffled to the nodes and hence may result in high shuffle cost. Existing works
attempted to reduce the communication cost by collecting some statistics from given
data and creating independent data partitions based on such collected statistics. Li et
al. [67] proposed PFP, an adaptation of the FP-Growth method for association rule
mining [48]. They proposed a method to partition a given dataset into a number of
subsets so that each subset can be processed independently and the amount of data
to be communicated among the processing nodes is minimized. The algorithm first
computes the support of all distinct items of the given dataset D to find the set of
frequent items. At this stage, the algorithm also discovers the universe of items I . I is
then divided into G groups using a single machine. The list of all the groups and a data
partitionDj is assigned to a mapper. The mapper then creates a pair containing a group
identifier and a list of all the dependent records in Dj for each group. At the reduce
stage, a reducer is assigned a group and receives all dependent transactions from the
map stage. It then builds the local FP-tree and the conditional FP-tree recursively by
computing the frequent itemsets. The top-K most supported locally found patterns are
emitted by each reducer and are used to construct a list of globally frequent itemsets.
However, creating the independent data partitions may also require to replicate some
data to more than one node which may increase the memory requirement on each
processing node. Data elimination is another way to reduce the communication cost.
Park et al. [96] proposed a MapReduce-based method to perform skyline processing
from large data volumes. The method first uses a data sample to construct a histogram
called sky-quadtree. The leaf nodes of the quadtree with non-skyline sample points
only are marked as pruned. The unpruned regions are used to partition the whole
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dataset into regions and each region is mapped to a processing node for local skyline
computation. The local computation results are sent to a single machine for global
skyline output.
Another challenge is to perform global computations. For example, finding a max-
imum value globally from locally found maximum values may require to perform a
part of the computation serially. This limits parallelism. Mullesgaard et al. [83] pro-
posed a method to compute global skyline results without limiting the number of pro-
cessing nodes to one only. Their method divides the given data space into parts. The
partitions are mapped to different slave machines for local skyline computation. The
locally found skyline results are then grouped together in a way that each record and
its possible set of dominating records are grouped together. The groups are mapped
to different processing nodes and each processing node computes a part of the global
skyline.
Iterative processing: In MapReduce, each round is considered as separate. That is,
no data is kept between two MapReduce rounds. Setting up each MapReduce round
incurs parallelism overhead including the cost of setting up tasks on processing nodes
and reading data associated with the tasks. Algorithms designed to employ a large
number of MapReduce rounds may not be scalable and efficient, due to large paral-
lelism overhead. Recent algorithmic formalizations of MapReduce have also focused
primarily on optimizing the number of rounds used to solve a problem [58, 30]. Unfor-
tunately many applications exist where the number of required iterations is a function
of some characteristics of the given input such as size or distribution of certain val-
ues, and they are not directly supported by the framework and can cause considerable
performance overheads. Some examples of such applications are K-means [77], de-
terministic annealing clustering [101], and Pagerank [8].
One way to address this problem is to modify the MapReduce paradigm. Some exist-
ing variants [54, 133] generalize the data flow model supported by MapReduce. For
example, Dryad [54] proposed computation to be specified as a directed multigraph
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with nodes representing the processes and the edges representing the communication
channels among them. Map-Reduce-Merge [133] extends the existing map-reduce by
adding the merge step which can merge the output of two different MapReduce rounds
without setting up an extra MapReduce round. These generalized frameworks support
more complicated data flow patterns, but still require computations to be specified as a
directed acyclic graph.
Some other existing works [9, 27, 135] focus on addressing the problem of efficiently
supporting iterative methods, and proposed some other variations of the framework.
Ekanayake et al. [27] and Bu et al. [9] proposed to avoid reading unnecessary data
repeatedly from distributed storage, by identifying invariant data and keeping them
locally over iterations. Twister [27] also attempted to reduce parallelism overhead by
initializing mappers and reducers once in the beginning and pushing the map outputs
directly over the network to reducers instead of materializing them locally. Haloop
[9] caches and indexes the invariant reduce input and output across all reducers, in
order to reduce the shuffling cost and the cost of setting up a separate MapReduce job
to evaluate the termination condition. Spark [135] allows to keep the data partitions
in the memory of the worker nodes across different iterations, and also facilitates the
use of shared variables to distribute the read-only data and accumulate the information
from worker nodes.
However, these variations assume that most of the data remain static between iterations.
Iterations of some methods such as RBAT do not satisfy this requirement. Furthermore,
these variations also limit some features of the standard MapReduce framework. For
example, forcing the data to remain locally on fixed nodes means that the tasks in-
volving such data cannot be scheduled to be processed on multiple computing nodes
which may result in poor performance of the applications, especially over heterogen-
eous clusters. Also, some variations of MapReduce such as Spark [135] only supports
reduction of map output locally in the worker nodes (analogous to combiner in MapRe-
duce), but final reduction of all map output is only allowed to be done by a single node.
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This means that not all the resources are utilized at the reduce phase. Also, this may
not be scalable when the output of the map stage can not fit into the memory of a single
node.
Existing methods also attempted to use design-side strategies to reduce the number
of iterations. Ene et al. [29] used MapReduce for k-median and k-center clustering
of large datasets. The algorithm takes a constant number of MapReduce rounds to
construct a well-represented sample from the given dataset. At each round, the points
not represented by the sample are read in parallel, and the sample size is increased by
adding the points with a certain probability. All the sampled points, along with their
pairwise distances and any additional statistics from the given dataset (which is also
computed in parallel), are mapped to a single machine to run an instance of the sequen-
tial k-median or k-center clustering method. Riondato et al. [99] proposed PARMA, a
MapReduce-based approximation method for association rule mining. The algorithm
takes two MapReduce rounds. During the first MapReduce round, the given dataset is
scanned to create N random samples, which are mined independently by the reducers,
each using an instance of a sequential pattern mining method. The results created by
the samples in the previous phase are aggregated to obtain an -approximation of the
exact output with the probability 1− δ, where  and δ are pre-defined parameters. The
use of sampling may reduce the number of MapReduce rounds employed, but this may
be at the cost of some loss of quality or accuracy in the output. Panda et al. [93] adop-
ted MapReduce to construct a part of the regression tree from large training data. The
algorithm is based on an existing top-down method [24]. At the root node of the tree,
the algorithm requires examining the entire training dataset, in order to find the best
split predicate which is used to partition the data. The process is recursively repeated
until the stop criteria is met. The tree constructed so far is maintained in a distributed
cache and the nodes to be considered for further splitting are maintained in two queues
held in the memory of master node. One of the queues holds the nodes to be split se-
quentially. The splits of such nodes are performed in the memory of a single machine.
The second queue holds the remaining nodes. The algorithm reads the entire training
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dataset in parallel, and finds a set of good splits for these nodes. For each node, the
locally chosen set of splits, along with some statistics is collected centrally on single
machine, which aggregates the computations and outputs the best split.
Despite the focus on the problem of iterative computations (as evidenced by the work
surveyed here), scalability to large datasets in some iterative applications can still be
achieved by direct implementation of the sequential methods in MapReduce. These
methods keep the processing logic from their sequential counterpart. Verma et al.
[122] proposed a MapReduce-based method to make the selecto-recombinative ge-
netic algorithms [43] scalable to large datasets. Starting with initializing a population
with random individuals in a single MapReduce round, the algorithm iteratively creates
new populations by selecting and combining a set of individuals from the current pop-
ulation, until some convergence criteria is met. Each iteration is performed in a single
MapReduce round. During the map stage, the mappers compute the fitness value of
individuals in the current population, and shuffle the output to a randomly selected
reducer. A reducer (in parallel with other reducers) creates new individuals from a
given set of individuals by sections-and-recombination. Papadimitriou et al. [94] pro-
posed DISCO, an iterative distributed co-clustering method using MapReduce. The al-
gorithm alternatively performs row or column-wise scan of the given matrix, assigning
each row (or column) a group label to minimize the overall error. Each scan is per-
formed using a single MapReduce round. During the map stage, a mapper reads a row,
assigns a group label, and computes the associated per column statistics for that row.
The rows with the same group label are sent to the same reducer which merges them
into a single cluster and the associated statistics is aggregated for each group. Each it-
eration is followed by a global synchronization of the group matrix and a column-wise
data scan, which is also performed in the same way as row-wise scan, but on the trans-
posed matrix. This continues until the error does not decrease between two consecutive
iterations. McNabb et al. [79] proposed MRPSO, a MapReduce-based implementa-
tion of particle swarm optimization. Starting with initializing a set of particles (points)
with some random positions and velocities, the algorithm iteratively attempts to find
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the best possible position and velocity of each particle, with the goal to optimize some
given function. At each iteration, the mapper takes individual particles, computes their
new position and velocity, and also evaluates the input function to ensure that its local
best so far is updated. The updated state for the particle is shuffled to all its dependent
particles, which is then used by the reducers to update the global best in the neighbour-
hood of each particle. These methods highlight the fact that MapReduce can be used
for scalable computation from large datasets without sacrificing the quality or accuracy
of output results.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed the existing work relevant to our study of large transaction
data anonymization. We surveyed different models and privacy techniques used for
data anonymization. We discussed different generalization-based methods for transac-
tion data anonymization and compared them in terms of their ability to offer privacy
protection and retain data utility. We have seen that set-based global generalization
methods prevent one or both types of disclosures without significantly compromising
data utility. But all these methods search the solution space in an iterative manner.
We also surveyed the existing non-parallel attempts to address the problem of scalable
data anonymization. We have seen that techniques such as sampling or indexing are
not sufficient to deal with increasing data volumes and may compromise the privacy
and utility of anonymized data.
We also have studied different parallel models and discussed their features. We have
seen that MapReduce provides certain features such as abstraction to parallel execution
details and has been applied to address the problem of scalability in various domains.
Some recent studies have also focused on the scalability issue of privacy-preserving
methods but the problem of scalable transaction data anonymization still need to ad-
dressed.
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We also surveyed other applications of MapReduce for scalable computations and stud-
ied some limitations of the paradigm. We have seen that MapReduce allows limited
communication among processing nodes. Performing iterative computations may in-
cur large parallelism overhead and have been addressed in different ways. We have
seen that adopting modifications of MapReduce to address these limitation will limit
certain features provided by the framework. Therefore, these must be considered when
designing parallel solutions using MapReduce. In the next chapter, we study how
MapReduce can be used to parallelize RBAT, a set-based generalization method and
discuss different issues to be considered for our parallel solution.
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Chapter 3
RBAT and MapReduce
In this chapter, we study how MapReduce can be used to make set-based generalization
methods scalable to large data volumes without affecting the level of privacy and utility
they offer. More specifically, we formulate a MapReduce parallelization of RBAT.
Section 3.1 provides some important notations and concepts, and formally defines our
problem. We give an overview of RBAT in Section 3.2. Section ?? presents a brief
overview of how MapReduce works. Finally, Section 3.3 gives a general framework
to consider possible ways of parallelizing RBAT in MapReduce, and discusses the
important issues around these possible solutions.
3.1 Preliminaries and Problem Definition
Let I = {i1, · · · , i|I|} be a finite set of literals called items. Let |I| be the size of I . A
transaction t = 〈im, . . . , in〉 is a record where each ij (1 ≤ j ≤ |I|) is a distinct item of
I . A transaction dataset D = {t1, . . . , t|D|} is a collection of transaction records over
I . Any subset λ ⊂ I is called an itemset over I . The frequency of an itemset is called
its support in a given dataset.
Definition 1. (Support) Given an itemset λ, its supporting transactions in D are the
transactions containing all items of λ and the number of such transactions, denoted by
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σD(λ), is called its support. i.e. σD(λ) = |{t ∈ D ∧ λ ⊂ t}|.
Table 3.1 shows an example transaction dataset. 〈b, c, e,g,h〉 is an example trans-
action, where boldface indicates sensitive items. (b, c) is an itemset, and its support
σD(b, c) = 1 with the first transaction being its supporting transaction.
Patient Diagnosis Codes
Alice b, c, e, g, h
Bob a, c, d, i, j
Tom a, f, l
Jim b, e, g, h
Jerry d, f, l
Table 3.1: An example dataset D
We partition I into two disjoint subsets P and S such that P ∪ S = I and P ∩ S = ∅,
and represent their size by |P | and |S| respectively. S contains items that represent the
sensitive information about the associated individuals who need to be protected, and P
contains all other items called public items. We assume that S needs to be published
intact, since it is often required by applications [132] and that an attacker may have
knowledge about individuals in the form P . Also, each transaction record is assumed
to contain one or more items from P and as well as from S.
The background knowledge of an adversary is considered to be in the form of an item-
set. When the itemset has support below a certain threshold k then the adversary may
be able to use the itemset to associate an individual to his transaction with the prob-
ability higher than 1
k
, thereby breaching privacy. For example, consider the dataset D
shown in Table 3.1. Assuming that D is de-identified (i.e. not containing patients’
names). If an adversary knows that Bob was diagnosed with a and c, he will be able
to uniquely associate Bob with his transaction, and hence can infer that Bob was also
diagnosed with i and j. To protect this, PS-rules must be specified [72].
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Definition 2. (PS-rule) Given two itemsets p ⊆ P and s ⊆ S, a PS-rule is an implica-
tion of the form p→ s.
Each PS-rule captures an association between a public and a sensitive itemset. The
antecedent and consequent of each rule can consist of any public and sensitive items
respectively and many PS-rules can be specified by data publishers to capture detailed
privacy requirements. A published transaction dataset is deemed to be protected if the
specified PS-rules are protected.
Definition 3. (Protection of PS-rule) Given a dataset D, the parameters k ∈ [2, |D|]
and c ∈ [0, 1], a PS-rule p → s is protected in D if 1) σD(p) ≥ k and 2) Conf(p →
s) ≤ c where Conf is defined as σD(p∪s)
σD(p)
.
Condition 1 protects data against identity disclosure by ensuring that the probability of
associating an individual to his or her transaction in D using the antecedent of any PS-
rule is no more than 1/k. Condition 2 prevents sensitive item disclosure by ensuring
that the probability of linking an individual to a set of sensitive items specified by
the consequent of a PS-rule is at most c, given that the probability of associating an
individual to his or her transaction using the rule’s antecedent is no more than 1/k.
Diagnosis Codes
(a,b,c,d,e,f), g, h
(a,b,c,d,e,f), i, j
(a,b,c,d,e,f), l
(a,b,c,d,e,f), g, h
(a,b,c,d,e,f), l
Table 3.2: The most generalized dataset D˜
Given a set of transactions D and a set of PS-rules Θ, if any rule in Θ is not protected,
then D must be sanitized. We sanitize data, using a set-based generalization approach.
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The set-based generalization maps a combination of original items to a itemset con-
sisting of all these items.
Definition 4. (Set-based Generalization) Let P˜ be a partition of P . Set-based gener-
alization is a function φ : P → P˜ which maps each item i ∈ P to a generalized item
i˜ ∈ P˜ containing i.
Note that using set-based generalization, an item can not be mapped to an empty set.
Hence, each item i ∈ P is generalized to (i1, · · · , in) (1 ≤ n ≤ |P |). We use the
brackets to represent a generalized item. When i = φ(i), the item is mapped to its
original representation. In such cases, we simply drop the brackets.
Set-based generalization retains data utility better than other generalization methods
[87, 73, 75] due to their ability to represent a large number of possible generalizations.
Example 2. Suppose that we require k = 3 and c = 0.6. PS-rule ac → h is not
protected in D as ac has a support of 1 only. But ac → h is protected in D˜ given
in Table 3.2 where all public items {a, b, c, d, e, f} are mapped to (a, b, c, d, e, f) fol-
lowing the generalization, since ac is now supported by all transactions records and
Conf(ac→ h) = 0.5.
Privacy preservation is one aspect of anonymization. The other aspect is to retain the
utility of data. There can be many possible generalizations of a dataset, offering the
same level of privacy protection but the one which has minimum loss of information is
preferred. Different utility measures have been proposed to capture the loss of inform-
ation incurred by generalization. Some of them assume that the usage of published
data is known at the time of anonymization. For example, multiple-level mining loss
measure expresses the information loss in the detection of multi-level frequent item-
sets [115], when mining is performed on an anonymized dataset instead of the original
one. Classification Metric [57] assumes that the purpose of published data is to train a
classifier. Other general-purpose utility loss measures have also been proposed. Nor-
malized Certainty Penalty [131] penalizes the generalized data based on the number
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of its descendant nodes in a given generalization hierarchy. Generalized loss measure
[56] computes the information loss as the sum of the ratio of the number of leaf nodes
under a sub-tree rooted at each generalized node, to the total number of leaf nodes in
the generalization hierarchy. RBAT uses the Utility Loss (UL) measure [73], which
can be applied in the absence of a generalized hierarchy.
Definition 5. (Utility Loss) Given a generalized dataset D˜, the utility loss of a single
generalized item i˜ is given by UL(˜i) = 2
|˜i|−1
2|P |−1 × w(˜i) × σD˜ (˜i). The utility loss of the
whole dataset D˜ is calculated as UL(D˜) =
∑
∀i˜∈P˜ UL(˜i).
The UL measure given in Definition 5 captures the loss of information in terms of the
size of the generalized itemset, its significance (weight) and its support in D˜. The more
items are generalized together, the more uncertain we are about its original represent-
ation, hence more utility loss. w(˜i) assigns some penalty based on the importance of
the items in i˜. The support of the generalized item also affects the utility of anonym-
ized data. The more frequent the generalized item is, the more distortion to the whole
dataset will be.
3.1.1 Problem Statement
Privacy-preservation has two goals: achieving a required level of protection and re-
taining the data utility as much as possible. More formally, given a transaction dataset
D with a set P of public items, a set of PS-rules Θ, and the support and confidence
parameters k and c, find the generalization P˜ of all the items in P using set-based gen-
eralization so that the anonymized form D˜ of D, constructed by replacing P with P˜ in
D satisfies the following condition:
1. Each PS-rule of Θ is protected in D˜
2. UL(D˜)−UL(D) is minimum, where UL(D˜) and UL(D) are calculated accord-
ing to Definition 5.
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Algorithm 3.1: RBAT (D, Θ, i˜, k,c)
Input: Original dataset D, set of PS-rules Θ, minimum support k and maximum con-
fidence c.
Output: Anonymized dataset D˜
1: Q.enqueue(˜i)
2: while |Q| > 0 do
3: i˜← Q.dequeue()
4: {il, ir} ← Split(˜i)
5: D′ ← Update(i˜l, i˜r, i˜, D˜, D)
6: if Check(D′, Θ, k,c) = true then
7: Q.enqueue(i˜l)
8: Q.enqueue(i˜r)
9: D˜ ← D′
10: return D˜
Loukides et al. [75] showed that finding an optimal anonymized solution, satisfying
the above conditions is NP-hard. Also, the solution may not exist in some cases. For
example, if there exists a rule P → S ∈ Θ for which σD(P ∪ S) > |D| × c. We
consider how to achieve scalability, while maintaining the required level of privacy
and minimum possible loss of utility.
3.2 Overview of RBAT
RBAT [72] is a heuristic method for anonymizing transaction data using set-based
generalization. It allows detailed privacy constraints to be specified as a set of PS-
rules. The pseudocode of RBAT is given in Algorithm 3.1.
RBAT is iterative and works in a top-down fashion. Starting with all public items
mapped to a single most generalized item i˜ and D˜ containing the original transactions
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with all public items replaced by i˜, each iteration involves replacing a generalized item
i˜ with two less generalized items i˜l and i˜r. RBAT does that greedily by maximizing
UL(˜i)−(UL(i˜l)+UL(i˜r)). To find less generalized items of i˜, each iteration performs
three main steps as follows.
Step 1 (Finding a Specialization): RBAT uses a two-step heuristic to split i˜ into two
disjoint subsets (step 4). The first step finds a pair of items from i˜ that incur maximum
UL when generalized together. The pair is used to initialize two subsets. The second
step iterates over the remaining items of i˜, generalizing each item with the items of
either subset based on which generalization incurs less information loss.
Step 2 (Data Specialization): After the split, the dataset is updated to take the effect
of specialization (step 5). Given that i˜ is split into i˜l and i˜r, the algorithm creates a
temporary dataset D′ which is a copy of the current anonymized data D˜ but with all
occurrences of i˜ replaced by either i˜l or i˜r.
Step 3 (Checking for Privacy Protection): Finally, the check phase (step 6) ensures
that current specialization does not compromise the required privacy level. It checks
the protection of all PS-rules and returns true if all PS-rules are protected in D′, in
which case D′ is copied to D˜ and the items i˜l, i˜r are enqueued to be considered for
further split (steps 7-9). If check returns false, then the current split is discarded and i˜
is not considered for further split.
The algorithm continues the above three main steps until Q contains no generalized
items to be considered for further split and returns D˜ in the end (step 12). This top-
down specialization process constructs a binary tree called Split-Tree with root rep-
resenting the most generalized item and the set of leaf nodes called Split-Cut. The
generalized items represented by a Split-cut can not be specialized further without vi-
olating any privacy constraints.
Example 3. Consider the anonymization of the transaction dataset shown in Table 3.1
with k = 3, c = 0.6 and a set of PS-rules Θ = {be → gh, f → l}. Initially, all the
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public items inD are generalized to a single most generalized item i˜ = (a, b, c, d, e, f).
The generalized dataset D˜ produced at this stage is shown in Table 3.2.
The split phase attempts greedily to find two more specific representations of i˜ =
(a, b, c, d, e, f) in order to minimize UL. Since 〈a, e〉 is the pair in i˜ incurring max-
imum information loss when generalizing together, the algorithm uses it as seeds to
initialize two subsets. The remaining items {b, c, d, f} are iterated by the method in
the same sequence as they appear in i˜, and each item is generalized to either of the
subsets depending on which generalization incurs less information loss. This results in
two specialized items i.e. i˜l = (a, b, f) and i˜r = (c, d, e) being returned.
To ensure that the current split gives the required privacy level, a temporary dataset
D′ is created. D′ contains a copy of D˜ with i˜ replaced by i˜l and i˜r. That is, a, b and
f are replaced by i˜l = (a, b, f) where as c, d and e are replaced by i˜r = (c, d, e).
D′ is then used in the check phase. The check phase returns true, since φ(b)φ(e) =
(a, b, f)(c, d, e) and φ(f) are supported by more than k = 3 transactions in D′ and the
confidence Conf(be → gh) = 0.5 and Conf(f → l) = 0.5 is also not greater than
c = 0.6.
Figure 3.1: An example Split-Tree
After the check phase returns true, the generalized dataset D˜ and P˜ are updated. That
is, D˜ is updated to contain the dataset as shown in Table 3.3 and P˜ is updated by
replacing i˜ = (a, b, c, d, e, f) with i˜l = (a, b, f) and i˜r = (c, d, e). The split-update-
check iteration is repeated for the (a, b, f) and (c, d, e). Let splitting i˜l = (a, b, f)
and i˜r = (c, d, e) result in {(a, f), (b)} and {(c, d), (e)} respectively. Note that items
b and e are generalized to themselves. Now, the PS-rule be → gh is supported by 2
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transaction records, and hence will not remain protected after specializing i˜l and i˜r
further. Therefore, the algorithm return D˜ (Table 3.3). The Split-Tree of the anonym-
ization process is shown in Figure 3.1 with root representing the most generalized
item i.e. (a, b, c, d, e, f) and the Split-Cut containing the current set of mappings i.e.
{(a, b, f), (c, d, e)}.
Diagnosis Codes
(a,b,f), (c,d,e), g, h
(a,b,f), (c,d,e), i, j
(a,b,f), l
(a,b,f), (c,d,e), g, h
(c,d,e), (a,b,f), l
Table 3.3: An anonymized dataset D˜
3.3 Parallel Design of RBAT using MapReduce
There can be different ways to parallelize RBAT. Our goal is to achieve scalability
for large problem instances, but this must not be at the cost of high utility loss and
the loss of privacy level provided by RBAT. Therefore, we consider the solutions that
preserve the three key (iterative) steps of the heuristics used by RBAT. Figure 3.2 gives
a general framework for parallelization of the split, update and check phases of RBAT
using MapReduce.
As shown by Figure 3.2, the parallel solution is iterative. Each iteration consists of a
number of MapReduce rounds and performs the operations of split, update and check
in parallel. We consider parallelizing these steps by partitioning the inputs to RBAT
and performing computations on them in parallel.
There are different inputs to RBAT which may be considered for parallelization. Since
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Figure 3.2: A general framework for MapReduce-based design of RBAT
MapReduce assumes that the input considered for partitioning comes from a single
source, partitioning more than inputs is not supported by the model [23]. One way is to
partition the transactions only. This will allow the algorithm to deal with large data an-
onymization but partitioning transactions only will not be sufficient. Some operations
of the algorithm may not require to perform computations on D and therefore parti-
tioning D will not introduce any parallelism in such operations. For example, PS-rules
are checked using a temporary anonymized version D′ of D. Another reason is that
the method may not be able to deal with a large domain of items and a large number of
privacy constraints.
Another input to consider for partitioning is PS-rules. When anonymizing a transaction
dataset, each specialization may require a large number of PS-rules to be checked at
each iteration. So partitioning PS-rules may also be considered in our parallel design.
This will allow the algorithm to deal with large privacy constraints. Assuming that each
machine will have access to the whole dataset, the rule checking can be performed
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locally on each machine and there will be no shuffle cost. However, this will limit
parallelization to the check phase only because the split phase does not have PS-rules
as input. Such partitioning may not also allow to deal with large datasets because each
machine will require access to the whole dataset.
Transaction datasets can consist of a large domain of items. For example, some of the
real-world datasets such as the dataset released by AOL contained 10, 154, 742 unique
search queries and the records of 657, 426 users [97]. So partitioningD may not reduce
the overall memory requirement. For example, consider the first split when i˜ = P and
assume that D is partitioned. Finding a pair with maximum UL will require memory
at O(P 2). Therefore, partitioning the domain of items may also need to be considered.
Preserving the key steps of RBAT in its parallel design is also challenging due to lim-
itations of MapReduce (discussed in the previous chapter). In RBAT, these key steps
are performed in sequence repetitively. That is, each split-update-check iteration re-
quires more than one MapReduce round. Therefore, the parallelism overhead incurred
by each iteration may be high. Also, most of the operations of RBAT require a global
view of data. If the partitioning is not made carefully, high communication cost may
be incurred. For example, if each mapper requires to shuffle most of the transaction
records to the reduce stage, the communication cost of the MapReduce round will be
high especially when the size of the dataset is very large.
In Chapters 4 and 5, we further discuss these issues in detail and will attempt to address
them in our parallel design.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the concepts important to understanding our solution in
the following chapters. We presented a general framework to understand the design our
parallel method, and discussed different ways to perform partitioning and MapReduce
operations. Our discussion showed that uniformly partitioning one input only through
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all MapReduce-based anonymization operations (e.g. partitioning only Θ, domain of
items or D) may not lead to a scalable solution for all problem instances. Preserving
the key steps of RBAT and their sequence in its MapReduce-based parallelization may
also cause a large amount of parallelism overhead. Therefore, a more careful way to
parallelize RBAT is required. In the next two chapters, we analyse these issues in detail
and will discuss the solutions to address them in our parallel design.
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Chapter 4
Direct Parallelization of RBAT
In this chapter, we describe our first attempt to parallelize RBAT into a sequence of
MapReduce operations. We focus on the partitioning of input in order to make RBAT
scalable to large problem instances.
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are different partitioning strategies that can
be considered. We partition data D and the associated domain of items here, while
assuming Θ to be small enough to fit into the memory of single machine. This is
because while partitioning PS-rules can help improve performance, its size is unlike to
be huge in practice, and our focus in this direct parallelization of RBAT is to make it
scalable to large datasets.
Observing that the support computation required by the split and check phases (Steps
4 and 6 of Algorithm 3.1) and the update phase (Step 5) of RBAT, needs the whole
dataset to be scanned. Our solution partitions the data across the available computing
nodes and performs these operations in parallel. The data partitions created are all
disjoint. That is, no transaction records are replicated to more than one partition. Our
partitioning allows to control the number of distinct items in each partition. To create
the parallel tasks to be performed independently, our method only requires a small
amount of input to be replicated to each mapper. For example, PS-rules are copied to
all mappers at the check phase. In the following, we explain our method in detail. We
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describe our data partitioning approach and parallel support computation in Section
4.1 and 4.2 respectively, followed by the parallel MapReduce based design of RBAT
in Section 4.3. The notations used throughout our work are shown in Table 4.1.
Notation Description
D Original Dataset
D˜ Anonymized Dataset
Θ PS-rules
I Domain of items
P Public items
S Sensitive items
P˜ Split-Cut
i˜ Generalized item under specialization
k Minimum support for each PS-rule
c Maximum confidence for each PS-rule
M Maximum number of available mappers
R Maximum number of available reducers
Table 4.1: Notations used in our work
4.1 Data Partitioning and Representation
There are two important aspects that must be considered when designing a MapReduce-
based parallel solution. First, the partitioning must be made in a way that the workload
is balanced and replication is minimized among slave nodes. Second, the data must
be represented in a way that computations can be performed efficiently. Given a set
of transactions D to be anonymized and M mappers available, we partition D among
M mappers in such a way that each mapper gets approximately an equal number of
records. Generally speaking, there are two approaches to partitioning and representing
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D: item-based or record-based.
With item-based partitioning, a set of transactions is partitioned vertically based on
items. Let I be the domain of all items in D. We divide I into M disjoint subsets
Ij, 1 ≤ j ≤ M , and then hash D into M subsets based on Ij . Each mapper m is
assigned a set of pairs 〈i, v〉, where i is an item in Ij and v is a vector of identifiers
of transactions that contain i as an item. The assigned pairs are represented as the
following hash table:

i1 : t1,1 · · · t1,β1
i2 : t2,1 · · · t2,β2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
i|I|j : t|I|,1 · · · t|I|,β|I|

where i1, . . . , i|I| ∈ I serve as index, and tj,l, 1 ≤ j ≤ |I|, 1 ≤ l ≤ βj are identifiers
of transactions containing the index item. βj (1 ≤ βj ≤ |D|) represents the size of jth
vector. For example, using item-based representation, Table 4.2 can be represented as
follows.
TID Purchased items
1 b, c, f,
2 a, d, f
3 a, f
4 b, d, e, f
5 d, f
Table 4.2: An example dataset T
4.1 Data Partitioning and Representation 58

a : 2 3
b : 1 4
c : 1
d : 2 4 5
e : 4
f : 1 2 4 5

Item-based partitioning is efficient for support computation. For example, suppose that
the item-based representation (shown above) of the dataset shown in Table 4.2 is di-
vided into two partitions I1 and I2. Let I1 be assigned to a mapper and contain the
vectors corresponding to the items a, b and c. To compute σT (a, b), the method will
only need to access the vectors indexed by a and b. But when the vectors corresponding
to all the items of an itemset are assigned to different partitions, the support computa-
tion can not be performed locally at any mappers and may need to shuffle the relevant
vectors over the network to a reducer. For example, consider the same partitioning used
in the previous example. Computing the support of (a, d), will require both mappers
to shuffle the relevant vectors over the network. This may dramatically increase the
shuffle cost, specifically when the data is large.
Record-based partitioning, on the other hand, partitions data horizontally by records.
Given D has {t1, . . . , t|D|} transactions, it assigns about n = |D|M transaction records to
each mapper. That is, {t1, · · · , tn} are assigned to the first mapper, {t(n+1), · · · , t2n} to
the second mapper, and so on. Note that for efficiency purposes, we assign transactions
based on their arrival order, as it outperformed other two approaches discussed in [31].
However, our method can trivially be adapted to any other approach discussed in [31]
such as random partitioning. That is, to randomly assign the transaction records to
partitions.
Using the record-based partitioning approach, each mapper will have a disjoint subset
of transaction records Dj, 1 ≤ j ≤ M , where Dj may contain any items of I . The
assigned set of records is represented as follows:
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
t1 : i1,1 · · · i1,α1
t2 : i2,1 · · · i2,α2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
t|Dj | : i|Dj |,1 · · · i|Dj |,α|Dj |

where ij,l-th (1 ≤ j ≤ |Dj|, 1 ≤ l ≤ αj) entry represents the lth item of jth transaction
record, and αj (i ≤ αj ≤ |D|) represents the number of items in jth transaction record.
This approach will only require count to be distributed over the network. For example,
consider the support computation of (ab) using the record-based representation of T
shown in Table 4.2. Let T be partitioned into two subsets with T1 containing the
first three transaction records and T2 containing the last two transaction records. The
support computation from T will only require σT1(ab) and σT2(ab) be computed and
sent to a single reducer. Therefore, the network cost does not grow with the size of
data to be anonymized. However, the support computation of a generalized item, using
such representation will require the scanning of the whole partition.
We may leverage a hybrid of both techniques for data partitioning and representa-
tion. Adopting record-based partitioning can potentially reduce the network cost which
could potentially be far more significant than performing an in-memory scan of the
data partition. So we assign each partition Dj to a mapper, and each mapper (in par-
allel to other mappers) reads its assigned subset for processing. To make the support
computation efficient, we can represent each data partition Dj using the hashing struc-
ture employed by item-based partitioning. This approach will ensure low overhead for
shuffling the data over the network and will also make the support computation effi-
cient. But observe that the memory required by each partition may still be large due to
the number of items in each partition. To demonstrate this, considerD with the domain
size |I| is partitioned among M mappers. Assume that each partition is assigned |D|
M
transaction records and each item of I appears at least once in each data partition. The
memory requirement on each mapper will be O( |D|
M
× |I|). When |I| is large, each
partition may still require a large amount of memory.
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One way to handle a large domain of items is to construct a partitioning method that
allows to control the number of distinct items in each partition. To ensure this, we
represent the dataset using a matrix with |D| rows and |I| columns. The rows are
labelled with the transaction identifers and the columns are labelled with the items.
An element ai,j ∈ {0, 1} is 1 if jth item exists in ith transaction and 0 otherwise. For
example, the matrix representation of the transaction dataset shown in Table 4.2 is as
follows.

a b c d e f
1 0 1 1 0 0 1
2 1 0 0 1 0 1
3 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 1 0 1 1 1
5 0 0 0 1 0 1

Using the matrix representation, we partition data using a two-way partitioning ap-
proach: horizontal and vertical so that each partition contains a part of the whole do-
main. For example, the above matrix can be divided into four partitions as follows.

a b c d e f
1 0 1 1 0 0 1
2 1 0 0 1 0 1
3 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 1 0 1 1 1
5 0 0 0 1 0 1

Such partitioning allows to control the number of transaction records and the number
of distinct items in each partition. Once the data is partitioned using the two-way
partitioning approach, we represent each partition using an item-based representation.
For example, the first partition containing the first three transaction records and the
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columns corresponding to the items {a, b, c} can be represented as follows:

1 2 3
a 0 1 1
b 1 0 0
c 1 0 0

For simplicity of our discussion, we now assume that given |D| × |I| matrix represent-
ation of D is divided into {D1, . . . , D√M} horizontally and into {I1, . . . , I√M} vertic-
ally and we use the notation {D1, . . . , DM} to represent such partitioning. In general,
the number of partitions made vertically do not necessarily have to be the same as the
horizontal number of partitions.
4.2 Parallel Support Computation
We observe that support computation is the most frequent operation in RBAT that
requires full data scan. It is performed to compute the UL of generalized items and to
check if PS-rules are protected. In RBAT, the support is computed using Definition 1.
We now show how support is computed using MapReduce. Given D and a set λ =
{λ1, λ2, . . . , λh} where each λj (1 ≤ j ≤ h) is an itemset, the support of all item-
sets in λ can be computed using a single MapReduce round. D is partitioned into
{D1, . . . , DM} using the partitioning approach discussed in the previous section. Each
mapper then iterates over λ, computing and emitting the local support of each element
λa ∈ λ:
Map(Dj, λ1, . . . , λ|λ|) → [〈λ1, σDj(λ1)〉 . . . 〈λ|λ|, σDj(λ|λ|)〉]
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These partial supports are shuffled over the network to the corresponding reducers.
Each reducer (in parallel to other reducers) accumulates the partial supports corres-
ponding to λx (1 ≤ x ≤ |λ|) and computes the global support.
Reduce([〈λx, σD1(λx) . . . , σDj(λx)〉] → 〈λx,
M∑
j=1
σDj(λx)〉
4.3 Direct Parallelization of RBAT
In this section, we will discuss our parallel design of RBAT using MapReduce. We
mainly parallelize RBAT by partitioning data and performing all the required support
computations in parallel using the partitioning strategy and support computation pat-
tern discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. A schematic representation of our
parallel RBAT is shown in Figure 4.1. Our method assumes that the privacy constraints
are small enough to fit into the memory of a single machine.
Preprocessing: The algorithm starts with a pre-processing phase, which computes
the pairwise UL of all possible pairs of P . The pseudocode of this phase is shown
in Algorithm 4.1. Steps (2-10) compute the support of all the pairs, using a single
MapReduce round. In addition to computing the global support of each pair, the reduce
stage also computes the pairwise UL of all the pairs and outputs P where P is a |P | ×
|P | matrix with the rows and columns labelled by the items in P and an entry Pi,j
(1 ≤ i, j ≤ |P |) gives UL(i, j).
Note that the UL measure (Definition 5) is symmetric e.g. UL(ix, iy) = UL(iy, ix), so
we only calculate the UL of the pairs corresponding to the entries of upper or lower
triangle only. Let |P | denote the size of P . The number of distinct pairs will be(|P |
2
)
= 1
2
· (|P | − 1) · |P |. Assuming that each mapper is assigned the same number
of transaction records and the number of items in each partition is also the same, the
memory requirement for each mapper to hold its assigned data partition is O( |D|
M
).
4.3 Direct Parallelization of RBAT 63
Figure 4.1: A schematic representation of Parallel RBAT
Each mapper also creates and holds ( (|P |−1)|P |
2
) output pairs. Therefore, the amount
of memory required by a mapper on each machine will be O( |D|
M
+ (|P |−1)|P |
2
). For a
mapper, the cost of creating the index-based representation of its assigned data partition
is O( |D|
M
). Considering that each mapper computes the partial support of all pairs on
data partitions in parallel, the overall processing cost of the map stage consists of the
cost involved in representing the partitions using item-based scheme and computing
the partial support of all pairs, and is O( |D|
M
+ (|P |−1)|P |
2
).
Here, the number of distinct keys in the output pairs produced by the map stage is(|P |
2
)
. If the key space is partitioned into R equal partitions, and all R reducers copy
and process the map output in parallel, the shuffling cost in the worst case (when no
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reducer resides locally to its assigned map output) and computational cost of the reduce
stage is O(M · (|P |−1)|P |
2R
).
Algorithm 4.1: COMPUTEUL (P )
Input: A data partition Dj , Domain of public items P .
Output: A matrix P , containing all pairwise
ULs.
1: Map(m, 〈Dm, P 〉)
2: Dm ← Load the m-th partition of D from DFS
3: ix ← ∅, iy ← ∅
4: for x← 1 to (|P | − 1) do
5: ix ← x-th item of P .
6: for y ← (x+ 1) to |P | do
7: iy ← y-th item of P .
8: EMIT 〈(ix iy), σDm(ix, iy)〉
9: end for
10: end for
11: Reduce((ix iy), [〈σD1(ix, iy)〉, 〈σD2(ix, iy)〉, . . . , 〈σDM (ix, iy)〉])
12: P [x][y]← UL(ix, iy)
13: EMIT 〈(x y),P [x][y]〉
Finding Maximum Pair: The first phase shown in Figure 4.1 corresponds to the first
step of the split phase (Step 4) of RBAT. Given a generalized item i˜, the algorithm
uses a single MapReduce round with M mappers and a single reducer to find a pair
which when generalized together incurs maximum UL. Each mapper reads a subset
of a pre-computed matrix P containing ULs of all possible pairs of public items P
(Step 2). While reading its assigned subset Pm, each mapper keeps track of the pair
with maximum UL found so far, and shuffles to a single reducer in the end (Step 3).
Once all the locally found pairs with the maximum UL arrives, the reducer compares
them to find the pair 〈ix, iy〉with maximum UL globally. Since a mapper keeps the pair
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with maximum UL only, the memory requirement is constant irrespective of the size of
P . Considering that M available mappers read P in parallel, the overall computational
cost of the map phase is O( |P|
M
). Also, each mapper outputs only one pair, the maximum
number of pairs shuffled to a reducer is M . Therefore, the amount of memory required
at the reduce phase is O(M).
Note that the algorithm reads all pairs and their UL inP but certain pairs can be ignored
without comparison i.e. a pair containing an item which is not generalized to i˜. For
example, consider P = {a, b, c, d} and the matrix P shown as follows:
P =

a UL(a, b) UL(a, c) UL(a, d)
b UL(b, c) UL(b, d)
c UL(c, d)

At the first split, the most generalized item is to be specialized so all four items of P
are generalized to i˜ = (a, b, c, d). Splitting i˜ requires comparison of all pairs in P .
Suppose i˜ is specialized to i˜l = (a, b, c) and i˜r = (d). When splitting i˜l, the mappers
will only need the pairs containing a, b and c. So the pairs such as (a, d) or (c, d) are
not considered for comparison and ignored.
Algorithm 4.2: FINDMAXPAIR (˜i)
Input: A generalized item i˜ to split.
Output: A pair ix, iy ∈ i˜ such that UL(ix, iy) is max-
imum.
1: Map(m,Pm)
2: Pm ← Load the m-th partition of P˜ from DFS
3: EMIT(∅, 〈ia, ib〉) such that UL(ia, ib) is maximum in Pm
4: Reduce(∅, [〈ia1 , ib1〉, 〈ia2 , ib2〉, . . . , 〈iaM , ibM 〉])
5: 〈ix, iy〉 ← 〈iaj , ibj〉 such that UL(iaj , ibj) is maximum, 1 ≤ j ≤M
6: EMIT(∅, 〈ix, iy〉)
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Split using seeds: The second step of the split phase is iterative (Steps 2-16 of Al-
gorithm 4.3) and uses 〈ix, iy〉 to split i˜ into two less generalized items i˜l and i˜r. Initially,
Il and Ir are assigned the seeds ix and iy (Step 2). For every item iz ∈ i˜ that is not
a seed, a MapReduce round is used to decide whether it should be generalized with
Il or Ir (Steps 3-15). The M mappers read D in parallel and compute σDj(Il ∪ {iz})
and σDj(Ir ∪ {iz}). These partial supports from all the mappers are shuffled over the
network to a single reducer (Steps 4-7). The reducer then computes the UL of Il∪{iz}
and Ir∪{iq} and adds iz to either Il or Ir based on which generalization incurs less UL
(Steps 8-14). Finally, Il and Ir are returned as two less generalized items (Step 16).
For example, consider the split of i˜ = (a, b, c, d). Suppose (a, d) is the pair incurring
maximum UL on generalization. Let Il = {a} and Il = {d}, the first MapReduce
round generalizes b either with the items of Il or Ir. Suppose D = {D1, D2}, the map-
pers compute σD1(a, b), σD2(a, b), σD1(b, d) and σD2(b, d). The reducers aggregates the
partial supports and compute UL(a, b) and UL(b, d). Suppose UL(a, b) > UL(b, d),
Ir is updated to contain b and d. In the next MapReduce round, the algorithm computes
the UL(a, d) and UL(b, c, d) and assuming that UL(b, c, d) > UL(a, d), the algorithm
generalizes d to Il and return the generalized items i˜l = (a, d) and i˜r = (b, c).
Using such item-based representation, the partial support computation of an item from
a data partition is O(1). In order to compute the partial support σDj(Il ∪ {iz}) and
σDj(Ir∪{iz}), the number of indexed vectors to be accessed is (|i˜l|+ 1) and (|i˜r|+ 1).
Given that Il ∩ Ir = ∅, the computational cost of the map stage is O(˜i).
At each round of this stage, a mapper needs to hold a data partition of size ( |D|
M
) and
the generalized items i˜l and i˜r. So the overall memory required for a map task on each
machine is O( |D|
M
+ |P |). Note that each mapper outputs only one pair, containing the
partial supports σDj(Il∪{iz}) and σDj(Ir ∪{iz}). Therefore, the memory required for
the output at each MapReduce round is O(1). Since each mapper communicates one
pair only, the shuffle cost is O(M) at each MaReduce round. At this stage, all pairs
are received and processed by one reducer only. Therefore, the computational cost of
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reduce stage is also O(M).
Algorithm 4.3: MR-SPLIT (˜i)
Input: A generalized item i˜ to split.
Output: Less generalized items i˜l and i˜r
1: {ix, iy} ← FINDMAXPAIR (˜i)
2: Il ← ix, Ir ← iy
3: for each iz ∈ i˜ and z /∈ {x, y} do
4: Map(m, 〈Il, Ir, iz, Dm〉)
5: Dm ← Load the m-th partition of D from DFS
6: i˜l ← Il ∪ {iz}, i˜r ← Ir ∪ {iz}
7: EMIT(iz, 〈σDm(i˜l), σDm(i˜r)〉)
8: Reduce(iz, [〈σD1(i˜l), σD1(i˜r)〉, 〈σD2(i˜l), σD2(i˜r)〉, . . . , 〈σDM (i˜l), σDM (i˜r)〉])
9: if UL(˜il) > UL(˜ir) then
10: Il ← Il ∪ {iz}
11: else
12: Ir ← Ir ∪ {iz}
13: end if
14: EMIT(〈Il, Ir〉)
15: end for
16: return 〈i˜l = Il, i˜r = Ir〉
Update: As discussed in Section 3.2, RBAT undergoes the update phase after each
split and uses two less generalized items to create a temporary dataset D′. Let us
assume that i˜ is split into i˜l and i˜r. Suppose the anonymized form D˜ ofD is partitioned
among M mappers. Given a data partition D˜j , a mapper replaces all occurrences of
i˜ with i˜l and i˜r. Finding out if an occurrence of i˜ in a transaction record of D˜ is
to be replaced by i˜l or i˜r, requires access to the original representation Dj of D˜j .
For example, consider a transaction record t = {a, b, c,h}, its anonymized form t˜ =
{a, (b, d, f), c,h} and that the generalized item i˜ = (b, d, f) is split into i˜l = (b, d) and
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i˜r = f . Creating an updated version of t˜ requires replacing i˜ with i˜l or i˜r. Since, the
original representation of the item in t is b, which is now mapped to i˜l so the updated
version is t′ = {a, (b, d), c,h}.
This requires to hold three versions of a dataset. Considering that D′ is discarded if
the PS-rules are unprotected, one possible way to reduce the space requirement is to
update the generalized dataset D˜ after checking the privacy constraints. The algorithm
will not need to construct a temporary dataset and no specializations will be needed
to roll back on account of inadequate privacy. But, the check phase will require the
generalized dataset D˜ as well as its original counterpart D. Our approach is to keep
the current split-cut, instead of constructing and updating D˜.
We divide the update phase into two parts. The first part (depicted in Algorithm 4.4)
is performed after each split, and uses a single map-only round to update the current
split-cut. The current split-cut P˜ is partitioned into M subsets and each subset P˜m
is loaded into the memory of mapper m (Step 2). The mapper (in parallel to other
mappers) iterates over all the generalized items in P˜m, to find i˜. If i˜ is found, the
mapper replaces it with the specialized items i˜l and i˜r and returns the updated split-cut
partition P˜ ′m (Steps 3-8). If the mapper does not find i˜ in its assigned partition then P˜m
is returned (Step 9).
The second part (Algorithm 4.5) is performed once at the end of the anonymization,
when no split can further be made without sacrificing the required privacy level. This
is also a map-only round so incurs no shuffling cost. The mappers read the original
dataset D (step 2), and are also given a copy of split-cut P˜ . Given a data partition Dm,
a mapper m generalizes each transaction record t ∈ Dm by finding and replacing a
subset t˜ of P˜ containing the mappings of all the items in t (step 4-7). The generalized
form D˜m of Dm is then returned (step 8).
This will not require to store and/or load any other copy of the dataset except D. Also,
the check needs the split-cut and original dataset only. Next, we also show that this will
not significantly incur any extra computational or memory requirements at the check
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Algorithm 4.4: UPDATECUT (P˜ , i˜, i˜l, i˜r)
Input: A Split-cut P˜ , generalized item i˜, and its specializations i˜l and i˜r.
Output: The updated split-cut P˜ ′.
1: Map(m, 〈P˜m, i˜, i˜l, i˜l〉)
2: P˜m ← Load the m-th partition of P˜ from DFS.
3: for each generalized item i˜j ∈ P˜ do
4: if i˜j = i˜ then
5: P˜ ′m ← Replace(P˜m, i˜, i˜l, i˜r)
6: EMIT(∅, 〈P˜m〉) and return.
7: end if
8: end for
9: EMIT(∅, 〈P˜m〉)
Algorithm 4.5: GENERALIZE (D, P˜ )
Input: Original dataset D and, Split-cut P˜ .
Output: A generalized form D˜ of D.
1: Map(m, 〈Dm, P˜ 〉)
2: Dm ← Load the m-th partition of D from DFS.
3: D˜ ← ∅.
4: for each transaction t ∈ D do
5: t˜← A subset of P˜ , satisfying ∀i ∈ t, φ(i) ∈ t˜
6: Add t˜ to D˜m
7: end for
8: EMIT(∅, 〈D˜m〉)
9: return {D˜1, . . . , D˜M}
stage.
Rule Checking: The third step shown in Figure 4.1 corresponds to the check phase
(Step 3) of RBAT (see Section 3.2). To reduce the space requirements, we do not
4.3 Direct Parallelization of RBAT 70
create any generalized form of D, but rather check the privacy protection using the
original dataset D and the current split-cut P˜ . Consider a PS-rule p → s, an original
transaction record t ∈ D and its generalized form t˜ ∈ D˜. Let i ∈ P be a item, φ(i) be
its generalized representation, and {φ(i)} be the set of items generalized to φ(i).
Observation 1. If ∃i ∈ p, for which t ∩ {φ(i)} = ∅ holds true, then antecedent p will
not be supported by t˜
Observation 1 is based on the property of set-based generalization that a generalization
consists of a combination of all the items mapped to it. For example, suppose that a
generalized item (a, b, c) consists of a, b and c and all three items are generalized to the
same generalized item. Given that a transaction record in its generalized form, supports
a generalized item i˜ then its generalized form must contain any of the individual items
of i˜. For example, consider a transaction record t = {b, d, g,h}, its anonymized form
t˜ = {(b, c), d, (a, g),h} and a set of PS-rules Θ = {a d → h, a f → h}. Let φ(f) =
(e, f), the first PS-rule is supported by t˜ because φ(a) ∩ t = g and φ(d) ∩ t = d. The
second PS-rule is not supported by t˜ because φ(f) ∩ t = ∅.
The rule checking phase (depicted in Algorithm 4.6) employs a single MapReduce
round. During the map stage, a mapper m loads its assigned data partition (step 2)
into memory and also reads the current split-cut P˜ . The mapper iterates over PS-rules
Θ, computing and emitting the partial supports σDm(p˜) and σDm(p˜ ∪ s) for each PS-
rule (steps 3-5). Note that we need to compute the generalized form of each rule’s
antecedent and the partial support computation of each PS-rule is performed using
Observation 1. The partial supports are then shuffled over the network to reducers with
p→ s as key. The reducers compute the global support σD′(p˜) and σD′(p˜∪ s) for each
PS-rule (step 7), and return true or false based on if the rule is protected or not (steps
8-10).
Each mapper needs to load Θ, P , and a partition of D. The mapper also needs to hold
|Θ| output pairs. Therefore, the memory required on each mapper is O( |D|
M
+|P|+|Θ|).
Each mapper represents its assigned data partition Dj using item-based representation.
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Algorithm 4.6: MR-CHECK (D, Θ, k, c)
Input: Original dataset D, PS-rules Θ, Minimum support k, Maximum confidence c.
Output: True if each protected PS-rule and False other-
wise.
1: Map(m, 〈Dm, Θ〉)
2: Dm ← Load the m-th partition of D from DFS
3: for each rule p→ s ∈ Θ do
4: COMPUTE AND EMIT (p→ s, 〈σDm(p˜), σD′m(p˜ ∪ s)〉) using Observation 1
5: end for
6: Reduce(p→ s, [〈σD′j(p˜), σD′j(p˜ ∪ s)〉, 1 ≤ j ≤M ])
7: σD′(p˜) = Σ
M
j=1σD′j(p˜), σD′(p˜ ∪ s) = ΣMj=1σD′j(p˜ ∪ s)
8: if σD′(p˜) < k or
σD′ (p˜∪s)
σD′ (p˜)
> c then
9: EMIT(r, False)
10: end if
Let the maximum size of PS-rules in Θ be |r|. The cost of computing partial support of
all PS-rules is (|Θ| · |r|). So the overall computational cost is O( |D|
M
+ |Θ| · |r|). Each
mapper needs to shuffle a pair, containing partial support of a PS-rule. Let R reducers
copy the map output to reducers, the overall shuffle cost and the computational cost of
the reduce phase is O(M · |Θ|
R
).
4.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we empirically analyse the scalability of our parallel design (discussed
previously in Section 4.3). We measure the scalability with respect to large problem
instances and the resources available. More specifically, we measured the effect of
increasing cluster size, data volumes, the number of PS-rules and the domain size on
the performance of our method.
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We implemented our method using Hadoop version 1.0.3 1 API combined with Java
1.7.0_8. Hadoop is the most popular and open-source implementation of MapReduce.
It is also similar to Google’s implementation of MapReduce [38]. A Hadoop cluster
follows the master/slave architecture and consists of two main parts: data manage-
ment layer, which consists of a Namenode instance running over the master node and
a number of datanodes running over slave machines. The data are stored in the Ha-
doop Distributed File System (HDFS). Another important part is the execution engine,
which consists of a Jobtracker and a set of tasktracker instances. The main execution
is controlled by Jobtracker running over the masternode. All the MapReduce tasks are
performed by the Tasktracker daemons running over the slave (worker) nodes.
All the experiments were performed over a cluster of fifteen computers, running Ubuntu
10.0.4 operating system and physically located within the same building. The com-
puters were interconnected by a 100Mbps Ethernet connection. One of the machines
was allocated to run the master program. All the worker machines used to perform
MapReduce tasks were homogenous in configuration. The machine running the mas-
ter program contains four physical cores and 8GB memory. All the slaves have 3GB
physical memory, Intel CoreTM 2 Duo Processor Model E8500 with 6MB Cache size,
and two physical cores.
We used BMS-Web-View-1 [75], a real-world click-stream dataset with |D| = 59602
and |I| = 497, in our experiments. The maximum and average transaction size of the
dataset is 264 and 2.4 respectively. We acquired the larger data sizes by random selec-
tion and duplication of transaction records from the original dataset. 10% of the items
were randomly selected as sensitive items. In the set of experiments, we do not report
data utility, since our parallel version preserves the processing of its sequential coun-
terpart and hence gives exactly the same anonymized results given by RBAT. Unless
otherwise specified, our default settings for the experiments are given in Table 4.3
To get maximum possible performance, we followed the existing relevant work [112]
1http://hadoop.apache.org/
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Parameter Default value
|D| 32M (millions)
|I| 497
|Θ| 1,000
k 60
c 0.8
M 32
R 8
Table 4.3: The default parameter settings for experiments
and customized the Hadoop based on the availability of resources as shown in Table
4.4.
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Figure 4.2: Datasize vs. Runtime
To check scalability with respect to increasing data volumes, we varied datasize from
2M to 128M (Million) transaction records and measured the response time of both
RBAT and our parallel implementation. As shown in Figure 4.2, the runtime of parallel
RBAT (P-RBAT) grew sub-linearly with increasing size of data and grew much slowly
than RBAT did. However, P-RBAT performed less efficiently than RBAT. This is due
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Parameter Description Value
mapred.job.reuse.
jvm.num.tasks
Allows the JVM re-use among con-
secutive tasks
-1(yes)
io.sort.mb Memory for sorting map output 300MB
mapred.child.ulimit The maximum memory, of a pro-
cess launched by the Map-Reduce
framework
2GB
io.sort.mb Memory for sorting map output 300MB
io.sort.spill.percent A limit of the buffer, after which re-
cords begin to be spilled to disk
0.85
mapred.{map/reduce}.
tasks.speculative.execution
Allow multiple instances of same
MapReduce task to run in parallel
true
mapred.reduce.parallel.copies The number of parallel transfers run
by reduce during shuffle phase.
8
Table 4.4: Hadoop parameter settings
to the overwhelming parallelization overhead, consisting of I/O, network and setup cost
incurred by each MapReduce round. We also observed that our method is less stable in
terms of runtime behaviour as the dataset becomes larger. For example, increasing |D|
from 2M to 4M increases the runtime by a factor of 0.1, whereas from 64M to 128M,
the runtime increases by a factor 0.8. This is because larger data sizes incur increased
I/O cost for each data scan, hence the increased overhead which affects the scalability
of our method. As described in Section 4.2, our method does not require the shuffling
of any transaction records. Therefore, increasing the size of D does not affect the
amount of data to be shuffled at any MapReduce round. The number of MapReduce
rounds also remains fixed, provided that the domain size does not increase. So the
setup and communication cost incurred by the shuffle stage of all MapReduce rounds
remained fixed too. This shows that our method can handle increasing data volumes
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in a scalable way for dense datasets [92]. If the domain size is large, the scalability of
our method can be affected by the increasing I/O cost, since the algorithm undergoes a
large number of MapReduce rounds.
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Figure 4.3: Scalability with respect to cluster size
We have also studied the scalability of P-RBAT with respect to the size of the com-
puting cluster. Figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b) show the response time and relative speed up,
respectively, with varying number of computing nodes used in anonymization. The
relative speedup is measured as the ratio of runtime obtained by the sequential RBAT
implementation, to the runtime of P-RBAT with a cluster size whose speedup is meas-
ured. The cluster size was varied from 2 to 14. We found that P-RBAT scaled better
when a small number of processing nodes were used e.g. 2 to 8. Setting the cluster size
to more than 8 nodes did not result in any significant performance gains. This is be-
cause of the associated overhead which is proportional to the size of cluster used. For
small cluster sizes, the performance gain is higher than the associated overhead and
increasing the workload causes decreased workload on each machine. Therefore, our
algorithm performs better until it attains maximum performance gain at certain point
(at cluster size of 8 nodes in our experiment). After this point, the algorithm starts
slowing down. This is because, when more nodes were used, the computation on each
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node is reduced, making the overhead resulting from setting up parallel processing a
significant proportion of the overall response time.
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Figure 4.4: Scalability with respect to cluster size
The overall speedup is far worse than the ideal (linear) speedup. We attribute this
to the parallelism overhead. Our further analysis (Figure 4.4) showed that most of
the overhead came from the split phase, which is due to mapping the sequential split
phase to MapReduce by only partitioning data. This affects the overall speedup of our
algorithm.
We also studied the effect of privacy parameters k and c on speedup of the algorithm
(Figure 4.3). Increasing c and decreasing k relax privacy requirements and allow the
algorithm to undergo further splits. As shown by the results, the algorithm attains bet-
ter speedup as the size of split tree grows. This indicates that most of the parallelism
overhead comes from the initial splits. The number of MapReduce rounds required
to split a generalized item i˜ increases proportionally to |˜i|. So the later splits are per-
formed using fewer MapReduce rounds, and hence the overall performance gain easily
offsets the parallelism overhead. This implies that the algorithm can be expected to
scale better with respect to increasing cluster size, when privacy requirements are tight
i.e. k is large and c is small.
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Figure 4.5: Performance with respect to |Θ|, k = 60, c = 0.8
To further examine the scalability of our parallel method, we also evaluated its runtime
behaviour with respect to increasing |Θ| from 1K (thousand) to 32K. As depicted in
Figure 4.5, the runtime of P-RBAT grows sub-linearly to the size of Θ. P-RBAT also
grows much slower in runtime than RBAT with respect to increasing |Θ|, but the overall
performance of P-RBAT is at least four times worse than its sequential counterpart.
Figure 4.5 confirms that this is mainly because of the parallelism overhead at the split
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phase. Our further analyses of the effect of increasing |Θ| on the check phase (Figure
4.5-b) also show that for a smaller number of 1K to 2K PS-rules, the performance
of P-RBAT’s check phase is nearly same as sequential rule checking. The difference
between the runtime of the two methods increases as the number of PS-rules increases.
For example, when |Θ| = 1K, the runtime of P-RBAT’s check phase is worse than the
sequential rule checking of RBAT by a factor of 30%. But, the check phase of P-RBAT
at |Θ| = 4K is better by nearly 30%. So the performance of our algorithm is better,
when large privacy constraints are involved.
During the check, the algorithm did not seem to utilize the resources effectively. For
example, P-RBAT performs rule checking using fourteen computing nodes, but the
runtime of its check phase is better than RBAT by only 7 times. To further investigate
the performance bottlenecks, we examined the runtime behaviour of P-RBAT with
different privacy parameter settings. Figure 4.6 shows when the algorithm undergoes a
single split-check iteration. Observe here that RBAT grows more slowly and performs
better than P-RBAT. Comparing the results to that in Figure 4.5, one can conclude that
there is a relationship between the performance behaviour of P-RBAT and the number
of split-check phases the algorithm undergoes. That is, the larger the split tree, the
more the number of times the rules are checked and hence causes P-RBAT’s check
phase to outperform the sequential rule checking. This is also an indication that higher
performance gain and better scalability can be expected when the required privacy is
not high and allows the construction of a large split tree during the anonymization.
Our further analyses showed that the main bottlenecks lie in the number of PS-rules
checked by P-RBAT which makes the ineffective resource utilization, because P-RBAT
checked extra rules not checked by its sequential counterpart. Figure 4.7 shows the
difference of the PS-rules checked by P-RBAT and the rules checked by RBAT with
k = 60 and c = 0.8. Both algorithms undergo three split-check iterations. As the num-
ber of given rules Θ increases, the difference of the rules actually checked by P-RBAT
and those checked by RBAT increases. This is because RBAT checks PS-rules sequen-
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Figure 4.6: Performance with respect to |Θ|, k = 80, c = 0.7
tially, and stops as soon as any rule is found unprotected. But during a MapReduce
round, there is no communication among mappers until the shuffle phase. So P-RBAT
can not know if any PS-rule is not protected until the end of the rule-checking round,
making checking all PS-rules necessary. In the worst case, P-RBAT checks (|Θ| − 1)
more rules than RBAT does in a single split-check iteration. This happens when the
first PS-rule in Θ is unprotected. On the other hand, considering a split-check iteration
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when all PS-rules are protected, both implementations check all |Θ| rules. In this case,
P-RBAT is observed to perform better than RBAT, provided that the size of Θ is large
(larger than 2K in our settings). To generalise this, suppose that an anonymization pro-
duces a split tree with n nodes (corresponding to split-check iterations the algorithm
performs). The number of inner nodes of the split-tree corresponds to the split-check
iterations when all rules are protected. So given that the size of the split-tree is n, the
number of times RBAT and P-RBAT check exactly the same number of PS-rules is
bn
2
c. The remaining dn
2
e are leaf nodes and correspond to the split-check iterations
when check returns false i.e. at least one PS-rule is unprotected. So with n split-check
iterations, P-RBAT at maximum checks (|Θ|− 1)×dn
2
emore rules than the sequential
check by RBAT. So the better resource utilization can be expected to be at first bn
2
c
split-check iterations which may be offset by extra communication cost of later dn
2
e
split-check iterations.
To further investigate this, we set k = 80 and c = 0.7 and analysed the performance.
The first split does not cause any PS-rule not protected. So the difference of the number
of rules checked by P-RBAT and the rules checked by RBAT is smaller than when
k = 60 and c = 0.8. This indicates that in order to make the algorithm scalable, the
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bottleneck due to the difference of the PS-rules checked by RBAT and P-RBAT needs
to be addressed.
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Figure 4.8: Performance with respect to |I|
We also tested the effect of |I| on the scalability of our method. As shown by Figure
4.8-(a), the runtime of P-RBAT grows much faster than RBAT as |I| increases. 4.8-
(b) shows the effect of |I| on scalability of the algorithm with respect to computing
resources. The runtime was observed to increase by at least 225%, as we double the
domain size. This is because the the number of MapReduce rounds vary with domain
size. Setting up a MapReduce round incurs the cost of setting up Map and Reduce
tasks, I/O cost of reading input and writing output. Therefore our algorithm makes the
effective use of resources when the domain size is small.
We also measured the scaleup [111, 46] which captures the scalability of a parallel
algorithm with respect to increasing size of computing cluster and the data size at the
same time. We measured the scaleup of P-RBAT by the ratio of the time taken by a
cluster size of one computing node only, to the time taken by m nodes on a workload
of (m × 8)M transactions. As shown by the results (Figure 4.9), the response time of
our parallel method remain nearly constant as we increase data size as well as cluster
size. This shows that our algorithm can scalably deal with large problem instances
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Figure 4.9: Scaleup
as large cluster size becomes available. Throughout the experiment, the scaleup was
observed to drop by less than 10%. This is because of ineffective resource utilization
due to design side restrictions. For example, splitting a generalized item i˜ requires
|˜i|−1 MapReduce rounds. At each MapReduce round, our design restricts the number
of machines to be used at the reduce phase to one. Therefore, increasing the number
of available processors can increase the number of mappers used in anonymization,
causing more intermediate output to be shuffled to the reducer, thereby incurring a
high network cost.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we attempted to address the problem of achieving scalability in large
transaction data anonymization. We proposed a partitioning method which allows to
deal with large datasets and the associated domain of items. Our partitioning scheme
allows most of the computations to be performed locally and therefore does not incur
high communication cost. To keep the tasks independent at each operation, our method
replicates a small amount of auxiliary input such as PS-rules or split-cut to each slave
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node. We also proposed a MapReduce-based parallization of RBAT. Our design pre-
serves the processing logic of RBAT, so gives exactly the same privacy/utility level as
RBAT does. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that our method can deal with
large datasets in a scalable way. But the response time of our algorithm is unreason-
ably slow. This is because of the parallelism overhead due to iterative computations at
the split phase and the extra computational cost due to the lack of interaction among
processing nodes at the check phase. In the next chapter, we will attempt to address
these performance bottlenecks at the split and check phases.
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Chapter 5
MR-RBAT: A Scalable Transaction
Data Anonymization Method
In the previous chapter, we discussed the direct parallel implementation of RBAT
which partitions data and performs different operations of transaction data anonym-
ization in parallel. The experimental evaluation showed that the algorithm can handle
increasingly large volumes of data in a scalable way. The algorithm preserves the pro-
cessing logic of RBAT, and therefore guarantees the same level of privacy and data
utility as RBAT does. But its response time is unacceptably slow. We attribute this to
the limitations of MapReduce. Our solution is iterative and each iteration requires a
number of MapReduce rounds. MapReduce does not support iterative processing well
[62, 9]. In MapReduce, each round is configured separately. This generates a signific-
ant overhead which offsets the gains from parallel processing. Also, MapReduce does
not allow communication among processing nodes at the Map and Reduce stages. This
causes the algorithm to perform extra computation at each iteration. In this chapter, we
give a detailed analysis of the performance bottlenecks of our parallel solution and
present a solution to address them. We also give an analytical study to estimate the
performance of our method based on given parameter settings. Section 5.1 proposes
improvements to our parallel anonymization method (described in Section 4.3) to deal
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with performance bottlenecks. We give our analytical study to estimate the perform-
ance of our solution in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 empirically evaluates our method and
finally Section 5.4 concludes the chapter.
5.1 MR-RBAT
In this section, we address the performance bottlenecks of our direct parallel method.
Recall that given a generalized item i˜, the split phase takes (˜i−1) MapReduce rounds to
find two more specialized items of i˜. This incurs large amount of parallelism overhead,
especially at the early splits of the anonymization process. For example, at the first
split, i˜ = P therefore the first split causes (|P | − 1) MapReduce rounds. Assuming
that i˜ is split into i˜l and i˜r, each specialized item containing
|P |
2
items. Therefore,
splitting i˜l and i˜r requires (
|P |
2
− 1) MapReduce rounds. Comparing to the first split,
these two splits incur less parallelism overhead but it may still be large enough to
offset the performance gains from parallelism. The algorithm can be expected to gain
performance after the first few splits. But this may not always be the case. For example,
splitting i˜ may result in split with |i˜l| = 1 and |i˜r| = (|˜i| − 1). In such cases, the later
splits may also be expensive in terms of parallelism overhead and may cause the overall
performance gain to be offset by parallelism overhead incurred by splitting generalized
items.
The extra computational cost incurred by the rule checking in parallel also needs to
be addressed. Since rule checking in parallel is performed using a single MapReduce
round, it does not incur high cost of setting up mappers/reducers and reading data. But
using a single MapReduce round results in limited communication among processing
nodes. As a result, all PS-rules are checked by the parallel method. During the early
split-check iterations, no PS-rule is unprotected and hence causes the parallel method
to perform better than its sequential counterpart. But when any PS-rule is unprotected,
the number of PS-rules checked by the parallel method may be greater than those
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checked by its sequential counterpart and hence may result in extra computational as
well as communication cost.
Our proposed method address these performance bottlenecks by controlling the num-
ber of MapReduce rounds at the split phase and by employing more than one MapRe-
duce round at the check phase. This will reduce the parallelism overhead at the split
phase and will increase the communication and synchronization at the check phase.
Fixing the number of MapReduce rounds used at each stage will fix the associated
parallelism overhead and may result in better performance of the algorithm. But set-
ting them to some arbitrary value may affect data utility or may not result in effective
resource utilization in all problem instances. We allow the user to fix the number of
MapReduce rounds to be employed at the split and check phases.
Algorithm 5.1 shows the overall structure of MR-RBAT. Algorithm 5.1 itself is per-
formed sequentially (by a single computer), and specifies the different MapReduce
operations, their dependencies and interaction with other sequential and/or parallel op-
erations. Note that all the MapReduce operations use the same data partitioning and
representation mechanisms we discussed previously in Section 4.1.
The algorithm starts with a pre-processing phase described in Section 4.3 and follows
the same top-down specialization as RBAT. The update is also performed in the same
way discussed in Section 4.3. The split and check phases are performed in a more
generalized way than our direct parallel implementation (discussed in Chapter 4), so
that the overhead can be controlled. In following, we describe in detail the revised
design of split and check phases.
5.1.1 α-Split
Recall that RBAT finds specialization of a generalized item using a two-step heuristic.
Given a generalized item i˜ to split, the first step uses a single MapReduce round to
find a pair of items in i˜ with maximum utility loss when generalized together. The
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Algorithm 5.1: MR-RBAT (D, Θ, i˜, k, c)
Input: Original dataset D, a set of PS-rules Θ, the most generalized item i˜, minimum
support k and maximum confidence c.
Output: Anonymized dataset D˜
1: P ← COMPUTEUL(P,D)
2: P˜ ← {˜i}
3: Q.enqueue(˜i)
4: while |Q| > 0 do
5: i˜← Q.dequeue()
6: {i˜l, i˜r} ← α-SPLIT (˜i, P˜ , D˜)
7: P˜ ′ ← UPDATECUT(P˜ , i˜, i˜l, i˜r)
8: if γ-CHECK (D, Θ, P˜ ′, k, c) = true then
9: Q.enqueue(i˜l)
10: Q.enqueue(i˜r)
11: P˜ ← P˜ ′
12: end if
13: end while
14: D˜ ← GENERALIZE (D, P˜ )
15: return D˜
second step is sequential and uses 〈ix, iy〉 to split i˜ into two less generalized items i˜l
and i˜r. RBAT does this by assigning ix and iy to Il and Ir first, then considering each
item iq ∈ i˜ − {ix, iy} in turn and assigning it to either Il or Ir based on UL(Il ∪ iq)
and UL(Ir ∪ iq). The direct parallelization of this heuristic (discussed in the previous
chapter) requires |˜i| − 2 MapReduce rounds, as the assignment of each item is recurs-
ively dependent on the assignment of the items preceding it. In the worse case when
the most generalized item is split to single items, one per iteration, it will require a total
of O(|P |2) MapReduce rounds. This will result in a significant setup and data loading
overhead.
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Alternatively, one may split i˜ based on seeds only. That is, we decide whether an item
iq ∈ i˜ should be assigned to Il or Ir based on UL(iq, ix) and UL(iq, iy). This would
then require only a single MapReduce round to split i˜. While this can cut the number
of MapReduce rounds significantly, it may cause substantial data utility loss. Consider
an extreme case where i˜ = {i1, . . . , i|P |} is the most generalized item, i1 and i|P | are
the seeds, σD(ij) < k/4, j < |P | and k/2 < σD(i|P |) < k. Assuming that a uniform
weight of 1 is used in UL calculation, then it is easy to see that using this strategy all
the items will be generalized with i1, resulting in i˜l = (i1, · · · , i(|P |−1)) and i˜r = (i|P |).
As σD(i|P |) < k, i˜ cannot be split, and the data has to be generalized using the most
generalized item i˜, incurring a substantial utility loss.
Observing that the split by seeds approach and RBAT are two extremes of paralleliz-
ation, we propose a generalization which covers a range of solutions between the two
extremes. More generally, we specify the upper bound α of MapReduce rounds to
employ for each split of MR-RBAT.
Definition 6 (α-Split). Given a generalized item i˜ and a pair of seeds ix and iy, α-
Split, 1 ≤ α ≤ |˜i| − 2, partitions i˜ into α buckets and splits i˜ in α iterations. Items
in each bucket are split based on seeds only, and the splits obtained from the previous
iterations are used as the seeds in the current iteration.
We revised the split phase of our direct parallel anonymization method (discussed in
previous chapter) using Definition 6 and call it α-Split. The pseudocode of α-Split is
given in Algorithm 5.2. The algorithm first finds the pair of items with maximum UL.
The search of the maximum pair is performed, using the same Max_Pair method
described in Section 4.3. The pair is then used to initialize Il and Ir (step 2), the
two subsets containing items of specializations of i˜. All the remaining items of i˜ are
partitioned into α buckets (step 3). Currently, the partitions are created by sequentially
assigning an almost equal number b = |˜i|−2
α
of items to the partitions. Let i′ = i˜ −
〈ix, iy〉, the partitions are made so that first partition of i˜ contains {i′1, . . . , i′b}, the
second partition contains {i′(b+1), . . . , i′2b}, and so on.
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Algorithm 5.2: α-SPLIT (˜i, α)
Input: A generalized item i˜ to split, and split threshold α.
Output: Less generalized items i˜l and i˜r
1: {ix, iy} ← FINDMAXPAIR (˜i)
2: Il ← ix, Ir ← iy
3: {˜i1, i˜2, . . . , i˜α} ← PARTITION(˜i− {ix, iy})
4: for h = 1 to α do
5: Map(mi, 〈Il, Ir, i˜h, Dm〉)
6: Dm ← Load the m-th partition of D from DFS
7: for each iq ∈ i˜h do
8: i˜l ← Il ∪ {iq}, i˜r ← Ir ∪ {iq}
9: EMIT(iq, 〈σDm(i˜l), σDm(i˜r)〉)
10: end for
11: Reduce(iq, [〈σD1(i˜l), σD1(i˜r)〉, 〈σD2(i˜l), σD2(i˜r)〉, . . . , 〈σDM (i˜l), σDM (i˜r)〉])
12: if UL(˜il) > UL(˜ir) then
13: Il ← Il ∪ {iq}
14: else
15: Ir ← Ir ∪ {iq}
16: end if
17: EMIT(r, 〈Il, Ir〉)
18: return 〈i˜l = Il, i˜r = Ir〉
Given Il = ix and Il = iy, α-Split takes α MapReduce rounds to split i˜ into two less
generalized items. At the jth round, the algorithm takes a partition i˜j (1 ≤ j ≤ α) and
decides for each item iq ∈ i˜j whether to generalize it with Il or Ir. Each mapper reads a
copy of Il, Ir, i˜j and its assigned subset ofD. It then iterates over each item iq ∈ i˜j and
computes the partial support of gen(Il ∪ iq) and gen(Ir ∪ iq) locally (steps 5-10). All
partial supports are then shuffled to the reducers. Each reducer aggregates all partial
supports related to iq and generalizes iq with Il or Ir, based on which generalization
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incurs less UL (steps 11-18). Il and Ir are then sequentially updated to contain all
the items of i˜j (step 19). This fixes the number of MapReduce rounds and hence the
associated parallelism overhead incurred by the split phase does not vary with the size
of the generalized item considered.
Note that the partitions are processed in sequence and the subsets Il and Ir are updated
at the end of each iteration. Also, as the items are assigned to the partitions (we al-
ternatively use the term buckets) in the same order as they appear in i˜, we have the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The split stage of our direct parallel anonymization (MR-Split) is a special
case of α-Split.
Proof. Let i˜ = (i1, . . . , i|˜i|) be a generalized item to split with the pair 〈ix, iy〉 incurring
maximum UL. Dividing the items in i˜′ = i˜−〈ix, iy〉 into α partitions gives {˜i1, . . . i˜α}.
The partitions are processed sequentially. At the jth MapReduce round, the subsets Il
and Ir contain the items of all preceding partitions i.e. all the items of {˜i1, . . . , i˜(j−1)}.
Setting α = |˜i| − 2, the size of each partition will be |˜i−2|
α
= 1. Consider that the
items are assigned to the partitions in the same sequence as they appear in i˜, we have
i˜1 = i
′
1, . . . i˜α = i|˜i′| in which case each partition contains an individual item. At the jth
MapReduce round, the algorithm generalizes i′j to either Il or Ir and the subsets Il and
Ir contain {i1, . . . , i(j−1)} and hence gives the same specialized items as MR-Split.
Lemma 1 shows that α-Split can be used to produce the same specializations of i˜
as produced by RBAT. But other anonymized solutions can also be produced using
different settings of parameter α.
Example 4. Consider a generalized item i˜ = (a, b, c, d, e, f) to split. Suppose the pair
of items of i˜ incurring maximum UL when generalized together is 〈a, e〉 which gives
i˜′ = i˜ − 〈a, e〉. Let α = 2 and the number of mappers is set to 2. Let i˜′ be partitioned
into i˜1 = {b, c} and i˜2 = {d, f}.
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During the first MapReduce round, Il = a and Ir = e. Each mapper m gets a data
partition Dm of size
|D|
2
and the first bucket i˜1 = {b, c}, and computes the supports
σDm(a ∪ b), σDm(e ∪ b), σDm(a ∪ c) and σDm(e ∪ c). Suppose that the number of
reducers is set to 2. All the partial supports corresponding to the item b of the bucket
go to the first reducer and those corresponding to c are sent to the other reducer, These
partial supports are then aggregated by the reducers.
The first reducer computes and compares UL(gen(a, b)) and UL(gen(b, e)) and gener-
alizes b with Il = a and the second reducer computes UL(gen(a, c)), UL(gen(c, e)) and
generalizes c with Ir = e. Il and Ir are then updated to contain items from i˜1 before
moving on to i˜2. The next MapReduce round repeats the same process over i˜2 = {d, f}.
Given that Il = {a, b} and Ir = {c, e}, the mappers compute σDm(a ∪ b ∪ d),
σDm(a ∪ b ∪ f), σDm(c ∪ e ∪ d) and σDm(c ∪ e ∪ f). These partial supports are
used by the reducers to compute UL of all the pairs. Suppose that UL(d∪ Il) > d∪ Ir)
and UL(f ∪ Il) > UL(f ∪ Ir), we have i˜l = (a, b) and i˜r = (c, d, e, f) as two less
generalized representations of i˜.
5.1.2 γ-Check
Recall that the direct parallel implementation of RBAT (discussed in the previous
chapter) checks all PS-rules in one MapReduce round. On the one hand, this incurs
a small parallelism overhead which does not vary with the size of Θ. The algorithm
will also require reading the dataset only once in parallel and hence the I/O cost will
not be large either. But this also limits the communication that can be made among
mappers. MapReduce is mainly designed for batch-processing over a shared-nothing
computing cluster. During a MapReduce round, the only way to perform communic-
ation and synchronization among worker nodes is by using the shuffle phase. It does
not allow determination of unprotected rules (if any) until the whole round is finished.
For example, if p → s ∈ Θ is the first PS-rule and is unprotected, the algorithm can
not determine this at the map stage since there is no communication among mappers
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except to reducers by shuffling partial support for aggregation. So the algorithm will
check all PS-rules in each check phase, even when the first PS-rule is unprotected. This
will incur the extra computational cost of processing all PS-rules, and also increase the
network cost because of shuffling partial supports of Θ rules to reducers.
Alternatively, the rule checking can be performed in the same way as RBAT does (Sec-
tion 3.2). This will require O(|Θ|) MapReduce rounds. At each round, the algorithm
takes a PS-rule and checks for its protection. At the end of each MapReduce round, the
algorithm synchronizes the results of the PS-rules checked so far and decides whether
to check the remaining PS-rules. This will allow the algorithm to stop as soon as the
first unprotected (if any) PS-rule is found but will also incur the I/O and setup cost
proportional to |Θ|.
Observe that sequential rule checking and checking rules in one MapReduce round are
two extremes of tradeoff between parallelism overhead and the extra computational
cost. Sequential rule checking will check the same number of rules checked by RBAT
so does not incur any extra computational cost but it will incur parallelism overhead
proportional to the size of Θ. Performing rule checking using only one MapReduce
round will have the minimum parallelism cost but it will incur maximum computational
cost. To allow a balance between parallelism overhead and the extra computational
cost, we propose a more general approach which allows the number of MapReduce
rounds to be specified and controlled.
Definition 7 (γ-Check). Given a set of PS-rules Θ, γ-Check, 1 ≤ γ ≤ |Θ|, checks Θ
in γ iterations. Each iteration checks |Θ|
γ
PS-rules in Θ.
Using Definition 7, we present the revised version of the check stage of our direct
parallel method (Section 4.3) in Algorithm 5.3. The algorithm partitions Θ into γ
subsets (step 1) and checks the subsets in sequence. The partitions are made in a way
that each subset contains |Θ|
γ
= n consecutive PS-rules of Θ. That is, Θ1 = {p1 →
s1, . . . , pn → sn}, Θ2 = {p(n+1) → s(n+1), . . . , p2n → s2n} and so on. During the
jth MapReduce round, a mapper m loads its assigned data partition Dm (step 4) and
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reads a copy of Θj . It then iterates over each rule p → s ∈ Θj , computing the partial
support of p˜ and p˜∪ s (steps 5-8), where φ(p) = p˜ generalizes p. Note that the support
computation is performed using the original dataset D and the current split cut P˜ , and
in the same way as the check stage of our direct parallel method (MR-Check) does.
The partial supports from all mappers with the associated PS-rules as their keys are
then shuffled to reducers. A reducer aggregates all partial supports pertaining to a PS-
rule and checks the protection conditions specified in Definition 3 (steps 9-13). The
algorithm will not undergo any subsequent rounds, if any rule is found unprotected
in the current round. Hence, γ-Check at maximum checks ( |Θ|
γ
− 1) more rules than
RBAT does, but would require a maximum of γ MapReduce rounds only.
Example 5. Consider checking Θ = {b e → g, a → j, c d → h, f → l} using the
dataset shown in Table 3.1. Let k = 2, c = 0.4 and γ = 2. The first MapReduce will
check first |Θ|
γ
= 2 PS-rules. Let D is divided into two partitions with D1 containing
first three and D2 containing last two transaction records. The first mapper computes
the partial support from the first data partition i.e. σD1(b e) = 2, σD1(b e ∪ g) = 1,
σD1(a) = 3, and σD1(a j) = 1. The second mapper computes the partial support from
D2 i.e. σD2(b e) = 2, σD2(b e ∪ g) = 1, σD2(a) = 2, and σD1(a j) = 0. Assume that
R = 2, the first reducer aggregates the partial support associated with b e → g and
returns false since Conf(b e → g) = 0.5 and the second reducer returns true since
Conf(a → j) = 0.2. The algorithm will not undergo the next MapReduce to check
any further PS-rules. The first PS-rule checked by RBAT is b e → g so our parallel
solution incurs the overhead of checking ( |Θ|
γ
− 1) = 1 extra PS-rule.
Performing rule-checking in some constant number of rounds provides a way to limit
the parallelism overhead to some constant. This also allows to control the trade off
between the cost of performing extra computations and the parallelism overhead. That
is, reducing the number of MapReduce rounds to employ at the rule checking phase
allows more computations to be performed at each MapReduce round and reduces the
synchronization level at the rule checking phase. It also allows to control the amount of
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Algorithm 5.3: γ-CHECK (D, P˜ Θ, k, c, γ)
Input: Original dataset D, Split-cut P˜ , PS-rules Θ, Minimum support k, Maximum
confidence c, Check threshold γ.
Output: True if all PS-rules of Θ are protected and False other-
wise.
1: {Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,Θγ} ← PARTITION(Θ)
2: j ← 1, protected← true
3: while j ≤ γ and protected = true do
4: Map(m, 〈Dm, Θj〉)
5: Dm ← Load the m-th partition of D from DFS
6: for each rule p→ s ∈ Θj do
7: p˜← φ(p)
8: COMPUTE AND EMIT (p→ s, 〈σDm(p˜), σDm(p˜∪ s)〉) using Observation 1
9: end for
10: Reduce(p→ s, [〈σDj(p˜), σDj(p˜ ∪ s)〉, 1 ≤ j ≤M ])
11: σD(p˜) = Σ
M
j=1σDj(p˜), σD(p˜ ∪ s) = ΣMj=1σDj(p˜ ∪ s)
12: if σD(p˜) < k or σD(p˜∪s)σD(p˜) > c then
13: EMIT(r, False)
14: end if
15: update protected← false, if any reducer emits False.
memory required at each mapper and reducer in a MapReduce round. That is, using a
small number of MapReduce rounds causes the increased amount of memory required
to hold the map output and the reduce input at each MapReduce round and increasing
the number of MapReduce to be employed at the rule checking phase will produce a
large number of map output pairs to be shuffled to reducers and processed by reducers
at the reduce phase.
Assuming that PS-rules are partitioned in the same sequence as they appear in Θ and
the subsets are checked in sequence, we have Lemma 2.
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Lemma 2. MR-Check and the check phase of RBAT are special cases of γ-Check.
Proof. Let |Θ| be the number of rules to be checked. Setting γ = 1 gives the number
of PS-rules to be checked at each MapReduce round as |Θ|
γ
= |Θ|. In this case, all
the PS-rules are checked in one round only and hence emulates MR-Check. Similarly,
setting γ = |Θ| gives |Θ|
γ
= 1 PS-rule to be checked in a MapReduce round, hence
emulates the sequential rule-checking of RBAT.
Note that each MapReduce round requires to readD into the memory of worker nodes,
therefore setting γ to large values may cause a significant I/O cost, especially when
|D| is large. We will further discuss this in Section 5.2.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, we have Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. MR-RBAT is a more general form of RBAT.
Proof. Consider a generalized item i˜ is to be split. Consider that the pair of items with
maximum UL is chosen as seeds to initialize Il and Ir and let α be set to (|˜i| − 2).
Following Lemma 1, α-Split gives the same specializations as the split phase of RBAT
does. Similarly, let the number of rules to be checked be |Θ|. Let γ = |Θ|, and
following Lemma 2, the algorithm checks the same PS-rules checked by RBAT. Setting
α = (|˜i| − 2) and γ = |Θ| gives a special case of MR-RBAT. Since α and γ be set to
any values up to (|˜i| − 2) and |Θ| respectively, MR-RBAT is a more generalized form
of RBAT.
5.2 Performance Estimation
This section presents an analytical study on the performance of MR-RBAT. We analyse
the cost of MR-RBAT’s split and check phases in terms of data and hardware charac-
teristics. More specifically, we attempt to find the cost of split and check phases with
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respect to datasize, size of a generalized item considered for a split, the number of PS-
rules, the number of mappers M and reducers R. For the sake of simplicity we assume
that we have (M + R) number of physical computing cores to run all M mappers and
R reducers in parallel and the number of map tasks are also the same as the number of
mappers.
The effect of α
In this section, we analyse the cost of α-Split with respect to given parameters. Fol-
lowing the common assumption [38], let tM , tS and tR be the cost of Map, Shuffle
and Reduce phases respectively of a single MapReduce round. The cost of finding the
specialized representation of a generalized item i˜ is given as follows.
Tα = α× (tM + tS + tR) (5.1)
The parallelization overhead of the map phase is constituted by the startup and disk I/O
cost. The disk I/O is performed while reading a data partition into the memory of each
mapper or spilling the intermediate output to the disk. We ignore the spilling cost and
assume that each mapper has enough space to hold the output pairs. Let sm(M) be the
setup cost of M mappers. Given data |D| is read by M mappers in parallel and let ω
be the average time that it takes to read a transaction (of average size in D) from the
distributed file system, the overall parallelism cost by map phase is given in Equation
5.2
tM = sm(M) +
|D|
M
· ω (5.2)
Given α, the map output pairs with the number of distinct keys produced is (|˜i|−2)
α
.
Given R reducers and considering that the map output pairs with the same key must be
5.2 Performance Estimation 97
sent to a single reducer, the degree of parallelism at the shuffle stage is determined by
min(R, (|˜i|−2)
α
). Let ξ be the network efficiency constant.
tS =
|˜i| − 2
α×min(R, |˜i|−2
α
)
· ξ (5.3)
During a MapReduce round, the number of pairs sent by each mapper is |˜i|−2
α
. So the
number of pairs sent by M mappers will be M × |˜i|−2
α
. Let s(R) be the start up cost of
R reducers. min(R, |˜i|−2
α
) reducers read M ×√|P ′| map intermediate output pairs in
parallel, the overall cost of reduce phase is as given in Equation 5.4.
tR = sr(R) +
M × (|˜i| − 2)
α ·min(R, |˜i|−2
α
)
· ω (5.4)
Substituting the cost of tM , tS and tR in Equation 5.1, we have the overall cost of
α-SPLIT using α iterations to split i˜.
Tα = α×
[
sm(M) + sr(R) +
|D|
M
· ω + |˜i| − 2
α×min(R, |˜i|−2
α
)
· (ξ +M · ω)] (5.5)
Clearly, a large α, which a direct parallelization of RBAT would imply, can result in
a significant overhead cost due to the setup and data loading requirements. We will
show in Section 5.3 that it is possible to use a small α in split to control overhead
while retaining good data utility. Note that at this stage, the number of computations
performed (effective CPU utilization) during the split stage is ( |D|
M
× (|˜i|−2)) and does
not vary with α.
The effect of γ
This section analyses the cost of γ-Check. Following Equation 5.1, the overhead in-
curred by a single MapReduce round can be calculated as the sum of parallelism cost
at map, shuffle and reduce stages.
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The cost incurred by the map phase is computed using Equation 5.2. Given γ MapRe-
duce rounds, a mapper outputs the partial support of |Θ|
γ
PS-Rules in a single MapRe-
duce round. The number of parallel connections to be utilized during the shuffle phase
is min(R, |Θ|
γ
). The shuffle cost of a single MapReduce round is given as follows.
tS =
|Θ|
γ ×min(R, |Θ|
γ
)
· ξ (5.6)
The total number of intermediate pairs produced at the map stage is M × |Θ|
γ
and
the number of reducers to be utilized for reading map output is min(R, |Θ|
γ
), the cost
incurred by the reduce phase is given as follows.
tR = sr(R) +
M × |Θ|
γ ·min(R, |Θ|
γ
)
· ω (5.7)
From Equations 5.2, 5.6 and 5.7, the overall parallelism overhead of a γ MapReduce
rounds is given as follows.
Tγ = γ ×
[
sm(M) + sr(R) +
|D|
M
· ω + |Θ|
γ ×min(R, |Θ|
γ
)
· (ξ +M · ω)] (5.8)
It is easy to observe from Equation 5.8 that γ also controls the level of parallelism
achieved at the shuffle and reduce stages. For example, setting |Θ|
γ
≥ R allows all
available reducers being effectively utilized at each MapReduce round. This is because
MapReduce forces all the pairs with the same key to be processed by same reducer.
Fixing γ also affects the computational cost of γ-Check. At a rule-checking stage, the
PS-rules in Θ may or may not be protected. Therefore, we analyse the computational
cost of γ-Check under both conditions. Let r be the average rule size. The case when
all PS-Rules are protected, the computational cost is given as follows.
Cγ = |Θ| ×
(
r +
M
min( |Θ|
γ
, R)
)
(5.9)
5.3 Experimental Evaluation 99
Notice that given that all PS-rules are protected, the computational cost at the map is
not affected by γ where as the level of parallelism achieved at the reduce stage depends
on γ.
Now, we analyse the case when one or more PS-rules are unprotected. Suppose that
nth is the first PS-rule found unprotected. In this case, the sequential method checks
the first n rules. When checking rules in γ rounds, suppose this unprotected rule is
found after checking all the rules of the first q rounds and x more rules of the (q+ 1)th
round by MR-RBAT so the number of rules checked by the sequential method can be
represented as follows.
n = q × |Θ|
γ
+ x (5.10)
Where q ∈ [1, γ], x ∈ [0, |Θ|
γ
− 1] and q × |Θ|
γ
≤ n < (q + 1)× |Θ|
γ
. The actual number
of MR rounds the algorithm undergoes γ′ can be calculated as follows.
γ′ =
 (q + 1) if x > 0q if x = 0
So MR-RBAT incurs the cost of checking (γ′× |Θ|
γ
−n) more rules than the sequential
method. Using the above relation and Equation 5.10, it can be observed that when
x = 0, the number of PS-rules checked by the sequential method and γ-Check is the
same.
5.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this Section, we empirically evaluate our work. Section 5.3.1 presents the scalability
of our algorithm (discussed in Section 5.1) and the data utility achieved, with respect
to different inputs (e.g. |D|, |Θ|) and the associated parameters (e.g. α, γ). Section
5.3.2 empirically tests the cost estimation of MR-RBAT (presented in Section 5.2).
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5.3.1 Evaluation of MR-RBAT
We implemented MR-RBAT to run as a master program (Algorithm 5.1). We used
ARE (average relative error) [72] and UL measures to quantify the utility of anonym-
ized data. ARE quantifies the data utility by measuring the difference between the
support of a query in the original data and the anonymized data. ARE is a widely used
application-specific measure, and is independent of the working mechanism of any an-
onymization method. The UL measure is algorithm-specific, but captures the loss of
information without considering any specific application of the anonymized data. We
measured ARE using a workload of 1000 randomly generated queries, with an average
and maximum size of 6 and 10 items respectively. Unless otherwise specified, we used
the same settings described in the previous chapter, except for |D| = 16M , k = 15
and c = 0.9. This caused RBAT to undergo a large number of split-check iterations
and hence allowed us to study the effect of γ on data utility.
We first tested the effect of α on runtime and on data utility. As can be seen from
Figure 5.1(a), runtime scales largely linearly with respect to α. This suggests that
dividing i˜ into different sizes of buckets had little impact on the outcome of split in each
iteration. This is further confirmed by the ARE and the UL results in Figure 5.1(b)-(c).
When α is very small, many items of i˜ are put into one bucket and assigned to Il or
Ir based on seeds only. This caused items with high ULs to be generalized together.
But setting α > 4, i.e. buckets are smaller enough, the α value only affected runtime
without affecting the utility of anonymized results in a significant way. This shows that
the performance of splitting i˜ can be significantly improved by using a relatively small
α without compromising data utility.
We also observed an interesting relationship between α and split skewness during these
experiments. Let Sα be the split tree constructed by MR-RBAT based on some α, and
i˜ be a non-leaf node of Sα with i˜l and i˜r as its left and right children respectively. We
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Figure 5.1: Effect of α
measure split skewness ξ(Sα) using Equation 5.11.
ξ(Sα) =
∑
i˜∈Sα
|| |˜il| − |˜ir| ||
|˜i| (5.11)
It was observed that split skewness decreased as αwas increased. This is because when
α is small, a large bucket of items will be split in a single round based on the seeds
only. If data distribution is such that generalizing most of items in the bucket with one
of the seeds produces a larger UL than the other seed does, then most of the items will
be generalized with one seed, resulting in a skewed split. Skewed splits are more likely
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to make Θ unprotected, resulting in an early stop in split and a higher ARE. This is
confirmed by Figure 5.2, which shows the average skewness at each split. This further
indicates that very small α values are to be avoided.
Figure 5.3 shows how MR-RBAT performed with respect to varying data sizes. For
smaller datasets, it performed no better than RBAT due to the overwhelming parallel-
ization overhead. However, the run-time of MR-RBAT grows much more slowly than
RBAT does, especially when α is small. This demonstrates its scalability to large data-
sets. It is interesting to observe the run-time for α = 32. At this setting, MR-RBAT and
RBAT achieved almost the same performance in terms of runtime. This suggests the
severity of overhead caused by iteration using MapReduce: the gains from parallel pro-
cessing has almost been exhausted entirely by the overhead. Figure 5.3(b) and 5.3(c)
show the ARE and UL results in these experiments. It is expected that setting a smal-
ler α would help performance, but could potentially affect the utility of anonymized
results. However, Figure 5.3(b)-(c) shows that almost identical utility can be achieved
when α = 32. This confirms the feasibility and effectiveness of using α in the split
phase of MR-RBAT to balance performance and utility retention.
We also evaluated the scalability of MR-RBAT at varying cluster size from 2 to 14,
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Figure 5.3: Scalability with respect to Datasize
and at different α values. Figures 5.4(a) and 5.4(b) show the runtime and speedup,
respectively. The relative speedup was measured as the ratio of runtime obtained by
the sequential RBAT implementation, to the runtime of MR-RBAT with a cluster size
whose speedup is measured. Comparing to the direct parallel implementation of RBAT
(discussed in the previous chapter), MR-RBAT performs nearly up to eight times bet-
ter, and hence shows the effectiveness of α towards better resource utilization. It also
achieved a near linear speedup when a smaller cluster (relative to data size) was used
(up to 4 in our experiments). This is because when a small cluster is used, the work-
load assigned to each machine is large. As we increase the cluster size, the workload
on each machine reduces and causes the performance gain. But after a certain point,
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Figure 5.4: Scalability with respect to Cluster Size
the workload on each machine reduces to the level that the setup cost and communic-
ation overhead dominates over the actual processing time. For example, using up to
4-nodes cluster sizes, the speedup is nearly linear whereas using a 14-nodes cluster,
the speedup drops to nearly 1
2
of the ideal (linear) speedup. One reason for this in-
effective resource utilization is the constant data size of 32M . When the cluster size
increased, the computation performed by each mapper became lighter, and the effect of
overhead on runtime became more significant. So adopting a suitable ratio of data size
to cluster size is important to achieving a good speedup. We also partially attribute this
to the MapReduce platform. MR-RBAT uses one reducer only in the first step of α-
SPLIT, and others are used as mappers. Increasing the number of mappers causes more
intermediate output pairs to be fetched and processed by the single reducer, thereby
degrading the speedup.
Next, we varied domain size to see its effect on runtime and the data utility. As shown
in Figures 5.5, MR-RBAT’s runtime was more stable and grew much more slowly than
RBAT did as the domain size increased. On the other hand, the difference in ARE as
well as in UL between RBAT and MR-RBAT increased slightly as the domain size was
increased. This is because MR-RBAT uses a fixed number of MapReduce rounds in
split. Increasing domain size causes more items to be put in one bucket. This causes the
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items causing high loss of information to be generalized together. Comparing to direct
parallel anonymization (discussed in the previous chapter), the overall performance
and the stability of MR-RBAT’s runtime growth is higher, but this also contributed to
an increased ARE and UL.
We tested the effect of γ on runtime. Note that a γ setting will only affect runtime,
not the utility of anonymized results, so only the runtime results are reported in Figure
5.6. Observe that initially the runtime was decreased when we increased γ (see Figure
5.6(a)). This is because when γ is small, the inefficiency introduced by γ-CHECK is
mainly from the need to check extra, but unnecessary rules. As γ increases, the number
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Figure 5.6: Effect of γ
of unnecessary rules to check decreases, resulting in a better runtime. However, as we
further increase γ, reduction through checking fewer unnecessary rules decreases, but
the cost of setting up more MapReduce rounds increases, making an increase in the
overall runtime.
Increasing the number of rules also caused the runtime of MR-RBAT to increase, but
much more slowly than RBAT did, except for γ = 1, as shown in Figure 5.6(b). When
γ = 1, MR-RBAT checks every rule in Θ and is not efficient for the reason we gave
above. All other settings of γ have resulted better runtime and scalability with respect
to the number of rules to be enforced in anonymization.
Finally, we tested the scaleup of our method. As shown by the results in Figure 5.7,
the response time of MR-RBAT remains nearly constant as we increase the data size
as well as the cluster size. The scaleup was observed to drop by less than 5% and
has improved by nearly 5% comparing to our direct parallel implementation. This is
because MR-RBAT allows to use more than one reducer at the second step of the split
phase whereas the number of reducers at the first step are still restricted to one only.
Therefore, the effective resource utilization is not made at the reduce stage.
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Notation Empirical Value (Seconds)
sm(M) 29.99325
sr(R) 15.331
ω 0.00000379
ξ 0.001058298
Table 5.1: Empirical values for evaluation of cost estimation
5.3.2 Evaluation of Performance Estimation
We used our implementation to test the accuracy of our cost estimation study. To carry
this out, we first computed the numerical values (shown in Table 5.1) for each variable
used in our analytical study and computed the parallelism cost of different settings (1
to 32) of α and γ using Equation 5.5 and 5.8 respectively. The values were computed
by running our implementation twenty times and in controlled settings e.g. to compute
sm(M), we tune our method to run an empty Map-only job and compute the average
of their runtime. The experiments were performed under the same default settings,
presented in Table 4.3.
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Figure 5.9: Evaluation of cost estimation of γ-Check with respect to γ
To check the accuracy of our analytical study, we compared the estimated cost with
the runtime acquired by actually running our implementations of the α-Split (Section
5.1.1) and γ-Check (Section 5.1.2) phases at different α and γ settings respectively.
As shown by our results shown in Figure 5.8 and 5.9, our cost estimation is close to
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the parallelism cost observed, using the implementations of α-Split and γ-Check. This
shows that our analytical study has estimated the cost well, suggesting that relevant
parameters have been considered and the model is reasonably accurate. This is signi-
ficant as this cost model could help set α and γ values, as we have seen in Section 5.2.
However, the estimated cost should not be expected to be an exact replication of the ac-
tual runtime overhead. We attribute this to the level of details captured in our analytical
study. For example, the study does not take into account the overhead which is associ-
ated with system calls for opening and reading local files at the map and reduce stages.
Note that throughout our experimental study, the number of map output pairs was not
high and hence the associated memory requirements were not higher than the memory
space available on each physical node running the map instances. Therefore, the actual
shuffle time of the α-Split and γ-Check implementations does not vary significantly
with varying α and γ settings.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have studied how performance of the direct parallel implementation
of RBAT on MapReduce can be improved. The direct parallel anonymization of RBAT
using data partitioning can incur an overwhelmingly high parallelization cost due to
the iterative operations to be performed. MR-RBAT employs two controls to limit
the maximum number of MapReduce rounds to be used during data generalization,
thereby reducing the overhead and computational cost. This improves the perform-
ance of the algorithm and also causes better resource utilization. We give an analytical
study to help estimate parallelism overhead, and hence the performance of our method.
Our analysis shows that the parameters α and γ may also be used to control memory
requirements in each MapReduce round. This ensures the scalability of our method,
when the generalized item to split consists of a large number of items and the num-
ber of PS-rules to check is large. We also empirically studied the effect of different
settings of these controls and found that MR-RBAT can scale nearly linearly with re-
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spect to large problem instances and the increasing cluster size, while retaining good
data utility. MR-RBAT also performed nearly up to eight times better than the direct
parallel implementation of RBAT, and up to 9 times better than the sequential RBAT
implementation over a cluster of 14 machines in our experiments.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summarises our contributions and discusses possible future research dir-
ections based on our current work.
6.1 Research Summary
Transaction data publishing has important applications in different domains, such as
personalized medicine and purchasing trend projection. However, identity of the in-
dividuals associated with transactions and the sensitive information contained in their
transaction records may be disclosed. Set-based generalization methods such as RBAT
prevent such attacks while retaining good utility of data, but they are all centralized and
can not handle large data volumes in a scalable manner. This research has addressed
the problem of scalable transaction data anonymization for large datasets. More spe-
cifically, we have parallelized RBAT using MapReduce. The contributions can be sum-
marised as follows:
• Data Partitioning: Data Partitioning is important to any algorithm that at-
tempts to process a large amount of data in parallel and it is important to the
parallelization of RBAT too. In our work, we proposed a two-way partitioning
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strategy for transaction data. The importance of our partitioning is two fold.
First, our method takes into account the characteristics of transaction data such
as the number and the length of transaction records, the number of distinct items
in the dataset etc. and is independent of the algorithm-specific computations to
be performed on the partitions. Our method may be used to perform different
operations in other transaction data anonymization algorithms e.g. the creation
of the count tree to achieve km-anonymity [114]. This also allows to balance the
workload associated with each partition. Second, our partitioning takes into ac-
count the restriction imposed by MapReduce. For example, MapReduce allows
limited communication among machines and the machines are only allowed to
communicate via network interconnection. Our method creates the partitions
in a way that each partition can be processed independently in parallel to other
partitions and only a small amount of data needs to be communicated among
machines.
• Parallelization of RBAT: We proposed two MapReduce-based methods for large-
scale data anonymization. Our approaches are the first to address the scalability
issues in transaction data anonymization. Our direct parallelization of RBAT
(P-RBAT) uses our partitioning method to design the MapReduce-based paral-
lelization of RBAT and allows to handle large datasets in a scalable way. The
method preserves the processing logic of RBAT while performing the key op-
erations of RBAT using MapReduce. Therefore, it gives the same level of data
utility as RBAT does. The loop-controlled method (MR-RBAT) improves the
response time of P-RBAT and allows to deal with the performance bottlenecks
which arise due to certain limitations of MapReduce. As suggested by the ex-
periments, the algorithm performs up to 10 times better using a cluster of 14
machines at the data utility loss by 5% comparing to its sequential counterpart.
The applicability of our results in terms of scalability, privacy and data utility
were also experimentally evaluated on different data, privacy and hardware char-
acteristics and similar results were achieved [82, 81].
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Our approaches address the limitations of existing MapReduce-based privacy-
preserving approaches outlined in Section 2.4. Both the approaches do not com-
promise the level of privacy provided by RBAT and therefore prevent the dis-
closure of both identity and the sensitive information in large transaction data
while existing approaches do not prevent both types of disclosure and focus on
identity disclosure in relational data.
• α Control: MapReduce does not support iterative computation well and a non-
negligible performance penalty is paid, since data must be reloaded and repro-
cessed in each iteration. We proposed α control which allows to control the
parallelism overhead by specifying the number of MapReduce rounds to employ
for performing iterative computations. Unlike other existing methods (outlined
in Section 2.5), our solution does not require any modifications to the frame-
work itself and does not perform any data elimination which may have largely
affected the level of privacy and utility that can be achieved in the anonymized
data. Our approach also has applications to the parallelization of other iterative
methods. For example, COAT [73] protects a privacy constraint by iteratively
selecting and generalizing an item from the itemset specified in the privacy con-
straint that has minimum support in given dataset. A greedy max-k-cover al-
gorithm [52] addresses the problem of covering a maximum set of elements with
a fixed number of subsets by iteratively selecting a subset from given input that
covers a large number of elements. Different methods for performing operations
from large graphs such as multi-way partitioning [60] also requires iterative pro-
cessing. Using our approach, these methods will allow to control the parallelism
overhead.
• γ Control: Another limitation of MapReduce is the lack of support of early
termination which would allow the processing nodes to cease processing, when
a specific condition holds. Such a limitation is due to the result of limited com-
munication among mappers and reducers in a MapReduce round and introduces
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performance-bottlenecks in various applications. A typical example arises in the
context of rank-aware processing e.g. performing top-k queries [53] in MapRe-
duce will require to process the whole dataset by mappers and will require to
communicate the locally found top-k queries to a single processing node. We
proposed γ control that allows to perform the intended processing in multiple
phases. At each phase, our approach uses a single MapReduce round to perform
a part of the computation and stops when a termination condition is met. This
will create α pauses in a given computation for checking the termination condi-
tion and will produce accurate results without requiring redundant work done on
each processing node.
• Performance Estimation: Setting α and γ to some small value will incur small
parallelism overhead and may cause effective resource utilization by allowing
to perform large number of computations in parallel. But this may also require
a large amount of memory on each mapper to hold map output. Setting these
controls to some large value will reduce such memory requirements but will also
incur large parallelism overhead which may offset the performance gain of par-
allel processing. Our analytical study helps estimating the cost of MR-RBAT
for these parameter settings. Our performance estimation captures the character-
istics of a physical architecture and given problem instance. Our performance
estimation has practical implications. Our experimental study (Section 5.3) con-
firms that the effect of α and γ on parallelism overhead and computational cost
is the same as predicted by our analytical study.
6.2 Future Work
This work has shown that our proposed methods can achieve scalability w.r.t large data
volumes and the available resources. Our work can be extended in various directions:
6.2 Future Work 115
• Multiple Specializations: A possible extension to MR-RBAT is to allow mul-
tiple specializations in parallel. Currently our methods preserves the sequence
of key steps of RBAT. That is, starting with the most generalized item i˜, it splits
a generalized item into two more specialized items i˜l and i˜r and performs the
checking of all PS-rules. Next, the algorithm considers i˜l and i˜r for further spe-
cializations using the split-check iterations in sequence. To make more effective
resource utilization, the specialization of i˜l and i˜r can be made in parallel.
• Data utility estimation: Our analytical study helps estimate the performance
of MR-RBAT for given parameter settings but does not give an indication of how
these parameter settings affect the utility loss of the anonymized data. Some ap-
plications such as biomedical studies [42] require high data utility. Therefore,
choosing the parameter settings that make a good trade off between perform-
ance gain and the utility of anonymized data is important. Our method can be
extended in this direction, to give some approximation guarantees for certain
parameter settings.
• Data Heterogeneity: Our partitioning method assumes that the dataset to be
anonymized only consists of the records containing a set of items only. For
real-world applications, the datasets to be published contain both relational and
transaction attributes [98]. For example, some analytical studies may require
purchasing patterns from customers of certain age groups or gender. Unlike
transactional data, relational data can contain numerical attributes such as age
or average income. Dealing with such heterogenous data containing relational
attributes and set of items requires a different partitioning strategy.
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